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Going Beyond the Postmodern in Contemporary Literature 
 
Introduction. 
The complications surrounding postmodernism as being against foundationalism and absolutism stem 
from its somewhat conclusive development into what has been described by many as a grand 
narrative. Postmodernism sought to recalibrate away from the grand narratives that potentially defined 
modernism, to break free from logic and definitiveness, and yet for most, it fell short, thus in turn 
becoming that which it fought so hard to undermine. Linda Hutcheon for example, asserts that the 
inclusion of postmodernism on the educational syllabus led to its institutionalisation.1 The general 
consensus surrounding the failure or apparent end of the postmodern is that it became something. 
Postmodernism, by definition, became a ‘period’. Whether or not this was inevitable is difficult to 
say. What seems to be the case is the need for definition and categorisation. All that the postmodern 
stood for was overwhelmed by terminology, by the incessant development of ascribing to it a sense of 
unique identification or definition – a factor it was supposedly set against in the very first instance. If 
the postmodern is in fact over, or has indeed failed as a literary and cultural ‘period’, there arises the 
ever-pressing question, that is, what has replaced it as a cultural position? This is a question 
embedded with contradiction. If the general assumption is that definition is unavoidable, there appears 
                                                          
1 Linda Hutcheon, ‘Gone forever but here to stay: the legacy of the postmodern’ ’, in Postmodernism. What Moment?, ed. by Goulimari 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011) pp. 16-18.   
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to be an equally general assumption, as outlined in the very make-up of postmodernism, that 
definition is also impossible. In this sense, there is a need to categorize the current ‘period’, and an 
overwhelming inability to do so, a paradox which surrounds any attempt to label the current situation 
post-postmodernism. Nevertheless, it is my attempt in this essay to investigate one of the possible 
movements, or periods that we have now entered into following the demise of postmodernism. 
 
 It will be discussed here that although postmodernism seems to have come to an end, there are 
continued signs of its on-going presence. I would like to suggest that if we have indeed moved out or 
away from postmodernism, this is not something that we are experiencing as a chronological 
progression. In addition to this, while there is an alteration of emphasis as we move from 
postmodernism into a new and emergent epoch, there is at the same time an awareness that ruptures 
have occurred between each ‘period’ all along. The aim of this work is to explore this supposed 
movement beyond postmodernism with reference to Tom McCarthy’s contemporary novel Remainder 
and Luke Rhineheart’s 1970’s cult novel The Dice Man. These novels explore various aspects of 
selfhood – particularly identity and authenticity – and its relation to the reality of human existence. 
Where classic postmodern theory would report upon the illusory aspects of selfhood and reality as 
essentially ‘constructs’ or ‘metaphysical’ concepts, my intention here is to demonstrate that these 
writers simultaneously accept and yet challenge these ideas. Their novels recognise and incorporate 
the postmodern critique of identity, agency and volition. However, at the same time they are also 
conveying the desire of their culture to locate a central happiness in the modern world that is 
substantial and authentic. From a postmodern standpoint, they recognise that this is not possible. 
Unlike traditional postmodern writers, they also regard it as necessary. These novels are therefore 
both ironic, deconstructive and playful postmodern texts, and attempts to contest the values of 
postmodernism. I will conclude this essay by attempting to assess whether these attempts can be said 
to constitute a viable and coherent alternative to the cultural paradigm of postmodernism. As has been 
suggested, there is something of a paradox in assigning definition to any given time or place, ‘period’ 
or moment, due to the continuous changes that are constantly taking shape. However, it seems 
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necessary to continue to try to understand ourselves and the world that we exist in if the human 
condition is to progress. 
 
 It is difficult to suggest that we have entered into a place in time that can categorically be termed 
‘after’-postmodernism; however, it is the contention of Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den 
Akker that there has been a development in society, one which has grown out of the values of both 
modernism and postmodernism. Vermeulen and Akker refer to this development as ‘metamodernism’. 
Metamodernism is perhaps the most compelling discourse which can be put forward as a possible 
replacement for postmodernism, and as such I will be discussing the metamodern in far more detail 
during the course of this work. This is due to its agenda to locate through theory the emerging aspects 
and aesthetics of an uncertain, globalised world. Vermeulen and Akker describe metamodernism as an 
oscillation between the modern and the postmodern, suggesting that it has come about as a result of 
the anxiety driven economy that we have entered into. Its primary conceptualisation is that there has 
been generated by anxiety a desire for improvement, a desire to return to modern ideals of 
authenticity, while at the same time there is an awareness of the certain failure to capture any sense of 
belonging or truth. This existence of paralysis, of being caught in an oscillation between the modern 
and the postmodern is the essential movement of the metamodern discourse. For Vermeulen and 
Akker, we are at this moment in time continuously attempting to abandon and challenge everything 
that we believe the postmodern to have stood for, in favour of a more enlightened existence, all the 
while accepting and having awareness for the fact that such a goal is forever unachievable. The 
oscillating movement is committed to with hope and engagement as we embrace the impossible. I will 
be addressing this problematic transformation from the postmodern into what has seemingly replaced 
it by examining metamodernism and relating it to Remainder and The Dice Man. 
 
Concerning the postmodern, it is difficult to evaluate just exactly when it occurred, and equally 
difficult to define it as a ‘period’. While it was not until the late 1970’s and early 1980’s when the 
6 
 
term ‘postmodernism’ had entered into the sphere of cultural debate in both the educational 
stratosphere and the socio-political arena, its aesthetic characteristics had already been observed long 
before. Its prominence as a concept perhaps became more widely understood with the publication of 
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition in 1979. However, as Patricia Waugh has noted, “‘postmodern’ 
tendencies began to emerge from the sixties onwards with a variety of philosophical orientations.”2  
What we at this point understand about the postmodern is that it is held in a space of opposition to 
modernism. It is essential that the postmodern is thought of not as a categorical progression which 
follows modernism temporally, but rather as an entity which opposes the values associated with the 
modern period, as Peter Barry makes clear, “they are not two successive stages in the history of the 
arts, but two opposed moods or attitudes”3 Brian McHale perhaps best describes this locus of 
configuration as a branch of philosophy which “follows from modernism, in some sense, more than it 
follows after modernism”4 (This may suggest that whatever follows postmodernism should be viewed 
as a following on from it rather than after it).  
 
Of the tendencies which are usually associated with postmodernism, such as multiplicity, 
fragmentation, disassociation, disruption, unpresentability, simulation – the list goes on – it is 
important to note that these should not be thought of as specifically ‘postmodern’ as they have been 
thought of in many other branches of human investigation throughout the ages. T.S. Eliot’s The Waste 
Land for example, has been observed by many as having both modern and postmodern characteristics, 
and could quite easily be found in either locale. Fragmentation is one of Eliot’s primary agendas in 
this poem, and yet it is traditionally thought of as belonging to the modern ‘period’.5 The difference 
between fragmentation associated with modernism and that which has been discussed in relation to 
postmodernism is that while modernist texts such as The Waste Land focus upon the concept of 
origin, postmodernism details a critique for fragmentation without origin: 
                                                          
2 Patricia Waugh, Postmodernism: A Reader (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), p. 2. 
3 Peter Barry, Beginning Theory, 3rd edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 80.  
4 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London: Routledge, 1987), p 5.  
5 Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle, An Introduction to Literature, Criticism and Theory, 4th edn (London: Pearson Longman, 2009), p. 
281. 
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…fragmentation in the postmodern does not depend on the possibility of an original ‘unity’ which has been 
lost. The Romantics and Modernists, by contrast, tend to figure fragmentation in terms of the loss of an 
original wholeness.6     
Eliot’s’ use of fragmentation marks the destabilisation of something that was once formed and 
coherent, whereas on the contrary the postmodern regards reality as fragmented but not generated 
from any sense of an original unity. 
 
The postmodern disassociation from a foundational origin is perhaps the most telling aspect through 
which it can be defined. For Bennett and Royle, the reality which is presented in postmodernism is a 
reality without origin.7 This notion is centred upon the postmodern concern for simulation. 
Simulation, as Bennett and Royle make clear, is nothing new. It was a concern for Plato just as much 
as it is now, or then, for postmodernism. Hugh J. Silverman suggests that “Plato would never let 
anyone forget that reality is somewhere other than appearance, that what appears is radically different 
from reality.”8 This sounds altogether familiar to what is thought of in regards to a postmodern sense 
of simulation. However, postmodernism differs from a simple binary between what is real and what is 
not real. In postmodernism, the presentation of reality, the simulation of it, is not in fact based upon 
anything original at all; the image, that which is a fabrication, stands alone as an ideological construct 
and is therefore what Baudrillard terms the ‘hyperreal’.9  Baudrillard explains that: 
Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or substance. It is the generation by models of a 
real without origin or reality; a hyperreal…Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory (Baudrillard 
1988, 166).10    
In postmodernism then, the real that we experience is not only not real, it is not real but based upon no 
sense of origin; in the postmodern world, our experience is that of a hyperreality, consisting of a 
                                                          
6 Bennett and Royle, Introduction to Literature, p. 282.  
7 Bennett and Royle, Introduction to Literature, pp. 283-284. 
8 Hugh J. Silverman, ‘Ereignisse of the Postmodern: Heidigger, Lyotard, and Gerhard Richter’, in Postmodernism. What Moment?, ed. by 
Goulimari, pp. 39-49 (p. 43). 
9 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, in Selected Writings, ed. by Mark Poster (Cambridge: Polity, 1988). 
10 Baudrillard, ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, Selected Writings, ed. Poster, p. 169. 
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simulated reality based on nothing. For Baudrillard, the world in which we live is an illusion of the 
real, so much so that the “desert” itself is not even a translation of the real ‘origin’ of the world, but a 
‘territory’ in and of itself. 
 
A further discussion of the postmodern will be provided in section one of this dissertation. I will refer 
to Fredric Jameson’s account of the postmodern and its relationship with capitalist culture. Jameson’s 
belief is that the postmodern ‘period’ grew out of a fast developing consumer society. My interest in 
Jameson’s take on the postmodern is linked to the relationship between my chosen texts and the 
relationships which they have with capitalist culture. This will be discussed in contrast to Linda 
Hutcheon’s concern for historiographic metafiction. Hutcheon asserts that postmodern fiction 
challenged modernist presentations of history by reflecting upon its failure to truly identify with 
historical inaccuracy. I will also be referring to Hutcheon’s arguments concerning the paradox of 
postmodernism throughout this work, particularly in my discussion of Tom McCarthy’s Remainder.  
 
Following on from the first chapter I will go on to highlight some of the theories put forward 
regarding the apparent ‘end’ of postmodernism. Josh Toth’s analysis of the demise of postmodernism 
is paralleled by the continuing existence of its ideological challenges in the contemporary world.11 
According to many theorists, despite the ‘period’ coming to an end as it were, the elements that we 
continue to insist belong to postmodernism appear to be widely in use in literature and the arts. I will 
then conclude this section by discussing the concept of metamodernism in more detail. 
Metamodernism is only one theory put forward concerning what has replaced postmodernism, and 
should not be thought of as the answer to what has, or is following postmodernism. It is my 
contention that metamodernism is as likely to be thought of as problematic as it is accurate for 
evaluating the contemporary landscape of uncertainty. However, it is perhaps the most accurate of 
several suggestions put forward as ‘new’ paradigms following on from postmodernism as it largely 
                                                          
11 Josh Toth, The Passing of Postmodernism: A Spectroanalysis of the Contemporary (Albany: State University of New York Press). 
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engages with the current state of the global landscape which is at this time in a position of abounding 
uncertainty.  
 
Section two of this work is split into two sub-chapters. The first is concerned primarily with the topics 
of trauma theory and that of the sublime. Tom McCarthy’s Remainder is widely associated with 
trauma or indeed the repercussions of traumatic injury and so an investigation into trauma theory is 
necessary. Due to the fact that metamodernism is thought by Vermeulen and Akker to be located upon 
a certain paradox, the difficulties of comprehending trauma are heavily linked to this theory. The 
same can be said of the study of the sublime, a study which has been a concern of philosophical 
thinkers throughout history, from Immanuel Kant to Lyotard. The postmodern, according to Lyotard, 
is intricately tied in with that of the sublime, and so I will demonstrate that there has occurred an 
evolutionary process of the sublime with the demise of postmodernism. The infinite nature of the 
sublime cannot be grasped by the faculties of the mind; however, its complexity can be portrayed 
through narrative fiction. Trauma and the sublime cannot necessarily be explained, but through 
narrative fiction an articulation of their aesthetics can be made.12 It will be suggested that narrative 
can be used to present the impossibility of presentation. Because of the relationship that exists 
between trauma and that of the sublime, narrative fiction can be shown to portray the possibility of 
communicating the unpresentable. Narrative fiction then, appears to be the perfect vessel through 
which the contradictions of trauma and the sublime can be conveyed suitably.  
 
Having discussed trauma theory and the study of the sublime, I will then provide an in depth analysis 
of Remainder. If metamodernism can be viewed as a likely replacement for postmodernism, then Tom 
McCarthy’s novel could well be envisaged as an embodiment of this overall shift into the realm of the 
post-postmodern. It will be discussed here that Remainder captures the fundamental aspects of the 
metamodern drive, and it is in its narrative that the metamodern motivation for presenting the 
                                                          
12 Roger Luckhurst, The Trauma Question (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 80-3. 
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unpresentable can be plainly observed. In addition to this, a further suggestion can be made that 
Remainder puts forward to the reader a contemporary observation concerning the infinite and 
paradoxical nature of the sublime. The novel is found to be located upon an infinite loop, marking the 
impact of the study of the universe, where time and authenticity become ungraspable entities, always 
beyond the reach of human comprehension. McCarthy’s work reflects the difficulties of 
comprehending trauma through the well-known coping mechanism of repetition, which his 
protagonist displays in the form of re-enactment. While it can be viewed as a postmodern novel, I will 
argue that Remainder challenges postmodern conceptions of inauthenticity as it searches for an 
elusive truth, marking it as a novel of the metamodern.  
 
The final section of this work discusses an alternate way of viewing the oscillation of 
metamodernism. I will suggest that the use of chance in Rhineheart’s The Dice Man incorporates both 
postmodernism and metamodernism in its philosophical aesthetic. As with Remainder’s protagonist, 
the ‘dice man’ is unfulfilled with his current existence in an artificial world. As a result, he allows the 
outcome of the die to dictate his every decision, relying on the notion of chance to decide his fate. 
Unlike McCarthy’s character, he attempts to disconnect from selfhood in order to embrace all aspects 
of his personality which up until he picks up the dice have remained hidden or repressed. Chance, it 
can be said, can be used to identify these repressed selves and engage with the paradox of achieving a 
final articulation of wholeness.  
 
The fiction that will be examined here appears to mirror the anxiety of the distorted identity in the 
contemporary social climate. However, the loss of memory and the subjectivity of history leads 
Marita Sturken to ask the question, “How does one narrate pain, in particular a pain that makes one 
feel abandoned in society?”13 For these authors, pain is at the centre of their narrative as both are 
concerned with dislocation, albeit for different reasons. Further to this they seem to take on the 
                                                          
13 Marita Sturken, ‘The Remembering of Forgetting: Recovered Memory’, Social Text, 57 (1998), 103-125. 
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necessary yet impossible task of laying that pain to rest and in doing so resemble a metamodern 
condition, conveying a positive drive, a desire articulated through hope and enthusiasm. The concern 
of these authors is to expel the ghost of postmodernism in order to progress toward a more complete 
notion of selfhood during times of crisis. 
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Part I: Postmodernism. 
 
I: History, Capitalism and the Postmodern Paradox. 
 
This dissertation is concerned with the aftermath of postmodernism, or to be more precise, the 
position of contemporary fiction as it stands in relation to what has replaced the historical period of 
postmodernism in literary theory. It is necessary however, to return to the particulars of the 
postmodern critique before discussing its replacement. The importance of this relates to the on-going 
presence of postmodernism within contemporary fiction, in spite of its apparent conclusive demise. 
Capitalist culture, for instance, continues to be a topic that is dealt with in much contemporary fiction 
today, and it is this branch of theory which is of particular interest to Fredric Jameson.14 Before 
discussing Jameson’s essay in more detail, it is worth providing a brief outline of his argument 
concerning the relationship between postmodernism and a capitalist driven consumer society.  
Postmodernism in Jameson’s terms: 
…is not just another word for the description of a particular style. It is also, at least in my use, a periodizing 
concept whose function is to correlate the emergence of new formal features in culture with the emergence 
of a new type of social life and new economic order – what is often euphemistically called modernization, 
postindustrial or consumer society, the society of the media or the spectacle, or multinational capitalism.15  
For Jameson, postmodernism is a term through which the emergence of a rapidly changing social 
order can be reflected. This does not suggest that postmodernism is a reflection of consumerist 
society, instead, it is a gateway through which to observe “the inner truth of that newly emergent 
social order of late capitalism.16  
                                                          
14 Fredric Jameson, ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Society’, in The Anti-Aesthetic (Port Townsend, Wash.: Bay Press, 1983) in The Norton 
Anthology of Theory and Criticism, eds. By Vincent B. Leitch and others (London: Norton & Company, 2001). 
15 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1962. 
16 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1962. 
13 
 
Jameson’s contention is that the postmodern can be defined as a period historically. In the same way 
that capitalism has developed periodically, the postmodern has followed on from modernism, and as 
such is a period in its own right. This is not an idea supported by Jean-Francois Lyotard, who regards 
the postmodern as “undoubtedly part of the modern”17 and is therefore not a distinct period at all. 
   For Lyotard, the postmodern is something which exists during the modern period, a rupture during 
modernism rather than after it.18 Both notions are of great importance when thinking about the 
contemporary situation in social theory. Jameson’s account of the aesthetics of postmodernism can be 
applied to its on-going presence in culture today, and Lyotard’s view that postmodernism exists as 
part of that continuing modernism is integral to the notion that whichever theory can be termed to 
govern post-postmodernism, is just another branch of theory bound by the continuation of the modern 
period. The thoughts of both Lyotard and Jameson on this subject are fundamentally important in the 
consideration of such a replacement for postmodernism. 
 
Central to Jameson’s account of postmodernism is that it is bound up and intertwined with that of a 
consumer capitalist society. It provides a framework for observation, for detailing the social order of 
capitalist consumption. At the end of his essay, Jameson leaves the question of emphasis open 
concerning the nature of postmodernism.  Modernism, as Jameson makes clear, “functioned against 
its society”, and postmodernism acts in a way which “replicates or reproduces – reinforces – the logic 
of consumer capitalism.”19 It is generally understood that there is a lack of resistance in 
postmodernism regarding its response to culture. Instead of contesting society, as with modernism, 
postmodernism loses the concern of resistance and instead works solidly and yet in a disengaging 
manner to report on the illusory images of capitalist society.20 This question of emphasis is something 
which Jameson explores through the differences between modernist parody and postmodernist 
                                                          
17 Jean François Lyotard, ‘Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?’, in Postmodernism, ed. by Waugh, p. 123.  
18 See Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979). 
19 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1974. 
20 While Jameson is of the opinion that postmodernism is apolitical, other theorists such as Linda Hutcheon denounce postmodernism as 
being apolitical. 
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pastiche. Parody, Jameson explains, is an imitation of an original concept or style.21 He suggests that 
writers of the modern period are often “defined by the invention or production of rather unique 
styles.”22 These unique forms share the commonality, according to Jameson, of belonging to a group 
of ‘unmistakable’ styles, distinct from one another, but on the whole, part of one single group of 
normality. It is the imitation of these styles which constitutes parody: 
…the general effect of parody is – whether in sympathy or with malice – to cast ridicule on the private 
nature of these stylistic mannerisms and their excessiveness and eccentricity with respect to the way people 
normally speak or write.23 
In order for parody to work, there must exist an original normality which can be ridiculed. With the 
postmodern however, where normality becomes a fabrication altogether, we are suddenly thrown into 
the realm of the pastiche.  
 
Pastiche, as Jameson asserts, works in an almost identical way to parody, which is why the two are so 
often confused with one another: 
 Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique style, the wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in 
a dead language: but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody’s ulterior motive, without the 
satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still latent feeling that there exists something normal 
compared to which what is being imitated is rather comic. Pastiche is blank parody, parody that has lost its 
sense of humour.24  
Because postmodernism reflects upon the destabilisation of social normality, revealing the fragmented 
image of truths, pastiche has nothing to ridicule and so its imitation of style is not achieved with the 
desire contained within parody, to constitute an end result or produce meaning. It works in a way 
which quite simply lacks any degree of desire, imitates for the sake of imitation, or as Terry Eagleton 
suggests, postmodern art reveals the workings of a world bound by illusion: 
                                                          
21 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1963. 
22 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1962. 
23 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1963. 
24 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1963 
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The aesthetics of postmodernism is a dark parody of such anti-representationalism: if art no longer reflects it 
is not because it seeks to change the world rather than mimic it, because there is in truth nothing there to be 
reflected, no reality which is not itself already an image, spectacle, simulacrum, gratuitous fiction.25 
Eagleton’s belief here is that postmodernism submits to a truth that there is nothing of the real world 
which is not conjured up, fabricated and displayed as a real entity. It reports on the illusion of reality, 
that what is shown and believed to be true is in fact merely a simulation altogether.  
 
Linda Hutcheon takes issue with Jameson’s use of the term pastiche, suggesting that he overlooks the 
paradoxical nature of postmodern parody. Hutcheon argues that what Jameson views as pastiche, the 
“imprisoning of the text in the past” should actually be thought of as postmodern parody, one which 
“both incorporates and challenges that which it parodies.”26 For Hutcheon, postmodern parody 
attempts to liberate the text from historical emancipation, while at the same time recognizes the 
“subjectivity” of historical ‘accuracy’, even in its own distorted portrayal of history. The postmodern 
in this sense does not attempt to rewrite the past; it suggests that history cannot be repeated in the text 
without becoming subjective. Thus, postmodernist texts which deal with parody are contradictory in 
nature. Looking briefly forward to the notion of what comes after postmodernism, it is clear that 
imitation is not disregarded in spite of the end of postmodernism; instead another alteration in 
emphasis becomes apparent. It will be suggested that for the metamodernist, imitation through parody 
or pastiche is not used in order to ridicule or to reveal that there is nothing there to ridicule, but 
instead in order to learn from history, work through the present and strive toward a desired future. 
Hutcheon’s analysis of the paradox of the postmodern appears to continue on into the next epoch, 
however with a refocused emphasis which relies heavily on the desire to reach verisimilitude.  
 
                                                          
25 Terry Eagleton, ‘Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism’, in Postmodernism, ed. by Waugh, p. 152. 
26 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of the Postmodern: History, Theory and Fiction (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 11. 
16 
 
Another feature of Jameson’s essay and a well-known characteristic of the postmodern ‘movement’ is 
the death of the subject.27 To a greater extent than his discussion of parody and pastiche, Jameson 
shows a more detailed difference between modernism and postmodernism. The death of the subject, 
as Jameson explains, is “the end of individualism”.28 What is meant by this is that for modernism 
proper, there was a huge emphasis on individuality, that what constituted art, literature and the world 
in general, were in fact formed on the basis of individual thought processes, distinct from one another, 
“as unmistakable as your fingerprint, as incomparable as your own body.”29 From a postmodern 
perspective, this unique or ‘private’ identity, in Jameson’s terms, becomes absent, and that through 
this absence, the individual subject decays: 
Yet today, from any number of distinct perspectives, the social theorists, the psychoanalysts, even the 
linguists, not to speak of those who work in the area of culture and cultural and formal change, are all 
exploring the notion that that kind of individualism and personal identity is a thing of the past; that the old 
individual or individualist subject is ‘dead’; and that one might even describe the concept of the unique 
individual and the theoretical basis of individualism as ideological.30  
Jameson suggests here that there are two possibilities regarding the postmodern take on the death of 
the subject. From one perspective, modernist individuality was once rife but has now come to an end, 
a transition constituted by the movement from “competitive capitalism” to “corporate capitalism”.31 
On the other hand, the modernist individual subject never actually existed, but was a mythological and 
ideological construct designed to give the illusion of the subject, of freedom, of uniqueness. The 
overall outcome of either of these two standpoints directs the postmodern period into a position of 
absence, the position that the subject does not exist. This leads on to Jameson’s final point concerning 
the loss of history.  
 
                                                          
27 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1964. 
28 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1964. 
29 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1964. 
30 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1964. 
31 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1964. 
17 
 
Jameson explains that postmodernism is able to reveal the workings of society, and that this can be 
shown through “ the disappearance of a sense of history” For Jameson: 
…our entire contemporary social system has little by little begun to lose its capacity to retain its own past, 
has begun to live in a perpetual present and in a perpetual change that obliterates traditions of the kind all 
earlier social formations have had in one way or another to preserve.32  
This ‘perpetual present’, without history and without future becomes the reality of postmodernism. If 
the old modernist values of individuality are consumed as something in the past, then there is nothing 
through which to evaluate our history. It is this sense of “historical amnesia” and the death of the 
subject that for Jameson embodies the postmodern ‘period’. Hutcheon, who has discussed the 
relationship between history and the postmodern at great length, suggests that the postmodern concern 
for history is primarily focussed on textual inaccuracy, as opposed to observing the removal of history 
altogether through a capitalist state. Hutcheon once again takes a stance against Jameson and his 
account of historical loss, explaining that history is known to us in the present only through 
“textuality”. “We cannot know the past except through texts”.33 Her argument is suggestive of the 
postmodern agenda which is to take issue with recalling the past historically but also to summon up to 
its audiences the “consequences” of this issue.34 Hutcheon suggests that postmodernism problematizes 
the past, revealing its illusory nature and strives to abandon subjective tactics, which to a large extent 
it certainly manages to do. However, the problematic and contradictory nature of the postmodern 
sense of abandonment from a modernist discourse, which contests ideology and subjective authority, 
as Hutcheon makes clear, becomes itself an ideology. Much like the metamodern, which will be 
discussed in due course, the postmodern is centred upon a central paradox, which is aware of its own 
contradictory nature. 
   The contrasting opinions of Jameson, Lyotard, Hutcheon and Baudrillard are central to our 
understanding of how postmodernism has been viewed and discussed in recent years. Their theories of 
the postmodern are integral to my discussion of the postmodern, but more importantly, they lay the 
                                                          
32 Jameson, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. by Leitch, p. 1974. 
33 Hutcheon, Poetics, p. 16. 
34 Hutcheon, Poetics, p. 16. 
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foundations for my discussion of metamodernism. Due to the continued presence of postmodern 
tendencies, as will be examined, metamodernism can be seen to be governed by postmodern theory. 
Further to this, these varying accounts of postmodernism can and will be applied to my chosen texts. 
Both novels can be seen as embracing the postmodern conceptualisation of capitalist culture, and for 
Remainder in particular, Hutcheon’s account of historical inaccuracy is of great importance when 
thinking about the transition from postmodernism to metamodernism in contemporary fiction.   
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II: The Demise of the Postmodern? 
 
The term “postmodernism” is still with us as a vague reference to French theory, historical meta-fiction, and 
eclectic hybrid forms in architecture and art. But the theoretical debate represented by “postmodernism” has, 
for better or worse, passed from the scene.                    
                                                                                                  John McGowan.35 
 
McGowan’s contradictory stance here is the overall opinion of many as to what has actually happened 
to the ‘period’ in question. It is generally assumed by most critical theorists that the postmodern is 
finished with, in fact, the very term itself has become increasingly unfashionable in recent years. 
Despite this, I believe that in order to understand the true nature of its so called replacement, again, if 
it has one, one must understand how postmodernism finally died out. Indeed, regarding this new 
period, Josh Toth suggests that “…this seemingly progressive move out of postmodernism is 
confronted at the outset by two pressing questions: has postmodernism, as Linda Hutcheon claims, 
finally “passed?”; and, if so, what is or can be after postmodernism?”36  
 
Within the many different theories located around this topic of what has come after postmodernism 
there does seem to be a recurring agreement between them that although the postmodern period is at 
an end, many of its characteristics continue to live on. As Andrew Hoberek explains, “For one thing, 
postmodern techniques – even if they no longer play quite the dominant role they once did – have 
hardly disappeared from contemporary fiction.”37 Toth furthers this argument, suggesting that the very 
nature of the debate surrounding the move away from postmodernism, only works to show that it 
continues to exist; “while heralding the close of a moment in cultural and epistemological history, the 
                                                          
35 John McGowan, ‘They might have been giants’, in Postmodernism. What Moment?, ed. by Goulimari, pp. 92-101 (p. 92).  
36 Toth, Passing, p. 4. 
37 Andrew Hoberek, ‘Introduction: After Postmodernism’, Twentieth Century Literature, 53: 3, After Postmodernism: Form and History in 
Contemporary American Fiction (2007), pp. 233-247 (p. 236). 
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current discussion ironically highlights the inevitable persistence of postmodernism.”38 Hutcheon 
furthers this line of thought arguing that the answer to the question, “is it dead or alive?” is “yes.”39 
The postmodern is both with us today, but at the same time is categorically over.  
 
It is clear that although there is a general understanding that we are now in a period after 
postmodernism, what becomes less clear is whether or not this is a distinct position in its own right, or 
whether we are entering or have entered a space in time which correlates merely to a continuation, or 
alteration of what postmodernism was, or what modernism was supposed to be in the first place. Both 
Toth and Hoberek appear to be of the same opinion that this new period or ‘epoch’ in Toth’s terms, 
should not be viewed as a break away from postmodernism, a new concept altogether, but only a 
transformation, or evolutionary process that signals a new emphasis in representation. For Gianni 
Vattimo, this continuation, or “historical process of ageing” is the concern of the postmodern debate 
more so now than ever before. Vattimo makes clear that there is in some sense a ‘superseding’ of the 
postmodern which is now in many ways more postmodern altogether.40 Much in the same way that 
postmodernism has been viewed as having commonalities with modernism, postmodern 
characteristics continue in that which follows it; however they are portrayed in different ways. With 
this in mind, it appears as though a change in emphasis has occurred. Toth explains that: 
…an epoch remains understandably definable (or perhaps, to a certain degree, synchronically exclusive) 
while also remaining quite understandably partial, an inevitable continuation of the past. Each episteme 
break is always, or only, a reconfiguration because its formation is necessarily contingent upon the fact that 
something (a spectre) always and necessarily passes on.41 
This continuation of the past suggests to the contemporary theorist that in order to understand the 
position of the current state after-postmodernism, we must, as Hoberek argues, “look backward as 
                                                          
38 Toth, Passing, p 4. 
39 Hutcheon, ‘Gone forever’, in Postmodernism. What Moment?, ed. by Goulimari, p. 17. 
40 Gianni Vattimo, ‘Postmodernity and (the end of) metaphysics’, trans. by David Rose, in Postmodernism. What Moment?, ed. by 
Goulimari, pp. 32-38 (p32). 
41 Toth, Passing, p.5.  
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well as forward, to consider what might have been taking place under our noses the whole time.”42 It 
would be quite difficult however to understand any sense of present tense when there is such a chaotic 
and fragmented history through which to evaluate it from. As will be discussed, this is one of the 
primary concerns of metamodernism. If postmodernism is in fact a failed project, it is perhaps 
necessary to evaluate what went wrong for postmodernism that constituted this mutation or shift into 
the contemporary situation after- postmodernism. However, it is equally important to maintain an 
understanding of the on-going presence of postmodernism in contemporary culture.  
 
Toth insinuates that the initial problem for postmodernism was the fact that it failed to escape the 
logocentric discourse that it was attempting to reveal in modernism, and essentially abandon in favour 
of a more transparent aesthetic. Toth makes clear: 
Because it was for the most part, a reaction to the dangers of logocentrism, to an increasingly hegemonic 
project of modernity, postmodernism was far more interested in exposing the absence of the real (or the 
signified, or the subject, or whatever) than it was in highlighting the need to identify such illusions as 
ineffaceable and essentially animating lures/possibilities.43   
For Toth then, the original project of postmodernism should have been to report on the impossibility 
of escaping the illusions that were maintained through modernity, and accordingly would have led to 
a far more successful development of postmodernism in general. Toth points us once again in the 
direction of Hutcheon, who suggests the idea that whatever has taken the place of the postmodern 
becomes the true postmodernism that it was trying to become all along. But for what we thought was 
postmodernism there was in fact a replication of the logocentric values it was seeking to expose as 
purely false.  
 
                                                          
42 Hoberek, ‘Introduction’, p. 239-240. 
43 Toth, Passing, p. 83.  
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In identifying that there is no original truth or logos through which to follow, but failing to announce 
the impossibility of effacement from those illusions already set in place, it seems that the primary 
effect of the postmodern was the announcement of a new form of logocentricity. In doing so, Toth 
would suggest that postmodernism endorses modernist logocentric characteristics inadvertently:  
…postmodernism rarely abandons…all logocentric lures…postmodernism employed a logocentric mode of 
critique – albeit, in an increasingly ostentatious and unsustainable manner – as a way of deconstructing the 
logocentrism of modernity.44 
The term ‘postmodernism’ then, simply becomes another ideology or critique, despite announcing a 
truth that there is no truth. It sets out to destroy logocentricity but ultimately absorbs it. As Toth 
makes clear, it uses this logocentric discourse in order to expose reality as false, and it is this mode of 
representation which he argues forces postmodernism into a “spectral return, a certain inevitable 
return of the repressed.”45 The ‘repressed’ in this case is not modernism proper that has returned, but 
the methodology by which modernism was governed. It is the spectre, ‘the ghost’ of modernism that 
returns through postmodern attempts to exorcise it. Because of this spectral return, there was a certain 
inevitability surrounding postmodernism that it was always going to become that which it was 
attempting to expose; an elitist mode of discourse; “It is, after all, the “elitism” of postmodernism that 
most critics identify as its most glaring failure.”46 Toth goes on to argue that in attempting to 
undermine fundamentalism, it becomes fundamentalist itself.47  
 
Through a reading of Toth’s The Passing of Postmodernism, it seems that for Toth, what caused the 
death of postmodernism was its own failure to become that which it was claiming to be announcing. 
Postmodernism’s demise in this sense is routed in its own aesthetic failure to escape the spectre of 
modernism, and therefore, “it could never deny without descending into absolute silence.”48 In 
accordance with Toth’s analysis, postmodernist thinkers made a foundational act of anti-foundational 
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thinking. His argument is compelling, though not without disruptions. Although he does indeed cite 
Hutcheon’s analysis that the postmodern returns as a reincarnation of what it was supposed to be all 
along, he takes issue with postmodern tendencies of ‘falling silent’ which constituted its demise, when 
it could be argued that it never intended to be coherent at all.49 Hutcheon on the other hand, argues 
that the postmodern veered towards an ‘end’ with its institutionalization academically, through 
publishing, in art and in the world of the theatre.50 It is likely that postmodernism was misunderstood 
throughout the 1990’s, and therefore its downfall may have occurred because it was made into 
something that it wasn’t. Mathewman and Hoey point out that postmodernism often acted as a proxy 
for other forms of communication, such as feminism for example.51 As such, it is a term which no 
doubt became overused altogether. It is important to recognise here that Hutcheon deliberately 
separates her discussion of the postmodern from feminism as this would subvert the important 
political agenda of feminism in general, despite the fact that feminism certainly played its part in the 
direction of postmodern growth.52  Nevertheless, for Toth at least, the failure of postmodernism 
allows for the rise of a period of ‘renewalism’ a term that can be compared and contrasted with that of 
metamodernism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 In Passing, Toth suggests that postmodern tendencies were to ‘fall silent’. 
50 Hutcheon, ‘Gone forever’, in Postmodernism. What Moment?, ed. by  Goulimari, p. 16. 
51 Steve Mathewman, and Douglas Hoey, ‘What Happened to Postmodernism?’, Sociology, 40 (2006), pp. 529-547.  
52 Hutcheon, Preface to Poetics, p. xii. 
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III: The Oscillation of Metamodernism. 
With the general assumption that postmodernism is now at an end, there is an equally general 
assumption that its replacement requires definition. This requirement is of course open to debate. It 
was discussed in the introduction that definition is a likely requirement, or rather there seems to be an 
inevitable need to categorize. I seek here to explore one of the avenues that have been located in 
recent years. The phrase Metamodernism, discussed here in regards to the thoughts of Timotheus 
Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker in 2010 is perhaps the most interesting of labels with which to 
apply the current position post-postmodernism.53 The reason for this, they argue, is that 
metamodernism is a response to the current economical social predicament which is in a state of 
unease and uncertainty. However, alternative suggestions have also been put forward such as Alan 
Kirby’s discussion of ‘digimodernism’, also known as ‘pseudomodernism’54 Kirby insists that what 
has taken the place of the postmodern has come about with the rapid emergence of technological 
advancements worldwide, a factor which should certainly be taken into consideration. Another 
possibility, suggested by Nicolas Bourriaud, is that following on from globalisation, we have now 
entered into a period which he refers to as ‘altermodernism’.  
 
According to Alan Kirby, digimodernism, or pseudomodernism is a term centred on the notion that 
the ‘text’ has evolved with the emergence of technology in recent years, most notably so with the vast 
increase of internet users throughout the world. Kirby suggests that in the cultural world of the 
pseudomodern landscape, consisting of a network of faceless participants, the text is no longer in a 
position to be merely observed. Instead, the text is located within the space of participation. The 
internet user creates the text, a website, a blog etc. with the click of a button, which can in turn be 
altered and modified by the next user, and so on and so forth. Kirby makes clear that the 
pseudomodern text is generated by those who interact with it, such as ‘phone-in’ shows like Big 
Brother, and shopping channels where the text functions only with the participation of the viewer. In 
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addition to this, the cultural text that entertains the viewer in cinemas and on television, the film, is 
less and less like a novel with each passing year, as movies appear to mimic interactive computer 
games, thus creating the illusion of participation. Kirby’s argument becomes increasingly more 
significant with the emergence of 3D films on the big screen and in our living rooms. Central to 
pseudomodernism, is the notion that the ‘text’ does not last for very long. As soon as it enters into the 
cultural landscape it is only a matter of time before it becomes obsolete. What this means for our 
culture, is that, as Kirby outlines, “A culture based on these things can have no memory…these are 
cultural actions in the present moment with no sense of either past or future.”55 The author is 
essentially a meaningless entity in the pseudomodern text and to a great extent, so too is the 
material.56 Kirby’s conception of the loss of authorship clearly resembles Barthes investigation into 
‘The Death of the Author’. The text is only there to be redefined at the moment of its creation and 
after that point it becomes completely residual. This is why Kirby suggests that the era that we are 
now in, the pseudomodern era, is a cultural desert which “takes the world away” and where the author 
always precedes the text.57 
 
Nicolas Bourriaud’s altermodern manifesto parallels and yet at the same time deviates entirely from 
Kirby’s discussion of pseudomodernism. Bourriaud’s presentation of the manifesto at the Tate gallery 
in London in 2009 portrays what he describes as a global altermodernity.58 The essential meaning of 
the manifesto articulates not only the coming together of artists from worldwide cultures, but the 
expression of ‘creolization’, where art has manoeuvred away from postmodern projections of 
multiculturalism and identity to investigating the current landscape of globalisation. Bourriaud 
suggests that artists are no longer defining their existence based on cultural identity; instead, they are 
depicting “the contemporary traveller” who has a global accent, a global identity, and as such, the 
altermodern era is that of the journeyman who negotiates with all cultures, travelling through time and 
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space. Rather than focussing upon Western ideals of cultural history, the altermodern artist observes 
the multiplicity of the subject, who is no longer the voice of any specific cultural domain. As with 
pseudomodernism, the altermodern space is globalized, however, unlike it, altermodernism is less 
focussed on the notion of a ‘cultural desert’. The landscape is altered, but with the announcement of 
global integration.  
   Both altermodernsim and pseudomodernism are possible to imagine as prevailing concepts. The 
advancement in technology can certainly not be disputed. However, Kirby’s impression of a 
digimodern world appears to reinforce postmodern tendencies rather than challenge them. The main 
obstacle for Bourriaud is the imagined world of a decentred Western ideology, which appears to be 
rather a radical observation in the aftermath of the fall of the World Trade Centre. Since 9/11, it can 
be argued, the contemporary situation is in a state of uncertainty, not a factor overlooked by Kirby, 
but perhaps more accurately made clear in Vermeulen and Akker’s discussion of metamodernism.  
 
Vermeulen and Akker dispel the suggestion that the metamodern or rather the end of the postmodern 
was a direct result of the terror attacks in New York on September 11th 2001. Their suggestion is that 
this event could only reinstate postmodern beliefs and assumptions. However, what seems to be the 
case when thinking about this new ‘epoch’ is that ‘9/11’ altered perceptions of the world entirely. 
Akbar S. Ahmed reports that the terrorist attacks disrupted the postmodern movement resulting in a 
return to the Grand Narrative that constituted modernism.59 Ahmed’s contention here locates the 
temporal movement from modernism to postmodernism, and then back again, with the collapse of the 
Berlin wall in 1989, constituting the end of the Grand Narrative, and the fall of the twin towers, 
landing us back in the realm of the Grand Narrative. Ahmed’s assessment here of the demise of the 
postmodern during 9/11 is certainly worth taking note of. With the fall of the Twin Towers, he argues, 
came a sudden return to an ‘us versus them’ mentality, driven by President Bush’s ‘grand narrative’ 
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like retaliation: “Bush’s “war on terrorism” became an expression of the Grand Narrative.”60 In 
contrast, there is at this time a reaffirmation of positivity with the presidency of Barack Obama and 
his widely known slogan, “Yes we can”. Two differing opinions then; Vermeulen and Akker making 
clear that postmodernism did not end with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the suggestion by Ahmed that 
“postmodernism lay buried in the rubble on that fateful day.”61 Ultimately however, there was 
certainly a change which occurred during or around that date. For Vermeulen and Akker, the date did 
lead to the development of the metamodern, as it began the current state of worldwide uncertainty and 
unrest. The notion of global uncertainty is a factor which Douglas Kellner refers to as the “prevailing 
condition”.62 Kellner argues: 
In the contemporary moment, society, culture and identity are all undergoing a tremendous rethinking. They 
are all currently in a state of crisis and confusion…not only are numerous human beings reshaping their 
ethnic, gender, and political identities, but humanity as a species is starting to seriously rethink its status63 
 This degree of uncertainty, anxiety and ambiguous ferocity is ultimately the current state of the world 
in which we live post-9/11, although not necessarily because of it, and it is a factor which the 
metamodern ‘epoch’ will strive to overcome. 
 
Concerning emphasis, the metamodern is a standpoint of reconfiguration of postmodern values, but 
for a completely new purpose. Where postmodernism worked simply to reveal ideological illusions, 
and as Jameson argued, existed in a ‘perpetual present’ as a direct response to consumer capitalism, 
the metamodern is a response to an ‘uncontrollable’, ‘unstable’, and ‘uneven’ global economy.64 It 
strives towards a desired future, not with a melancholic aesthetic, as with postmodernism, but with 
hope and engagement.65 However, and most importantly, the metamodernist is fully aware of the 
illusory nature of ideology, the very ideology that postmodernism sought to expose, and yet they 
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search for truth with hope and engagement in spite of this knowledge. Essentially, metamodernism is 
centred on a certain paradox, as Vermeulen and Akker make clear, “Inspired by a modern naïveté yet 
informed by postmodern scepticism, the metamodern discourse consciously commits itself to an 
impossible possibility.”66 
 
‘Notes on Metamodernism’, informs us that we have not entered into a new category of representation 
or social theory as an answer to postmodernism. Instead, it is postmodernism that has entered into a 
new space in time, as Vermeulen and Akker make clear, “…we do believe that many of them 
[postmodern tendencies]67 are taking another shape, and, more importantly, a new sens, a new 
meaning and direction.”68 As has already been suggested, the postmodern is not essentially over, but 
has reconfigured itself, or has been reconfigured by the global situation today. It is suggested by 
Vermeulen and Akker that in a categorical response to the uncertainties of the global economy, there 
has been a cultural ‘transformation’ which can be described as the metamodern period: 
Most significantly perhaps, the cultural industry has responded in kind, increasingly abandoning tactics such 
as pastiche and parataxis for strategies like myth and metaxis, melancholy for hope, and exhibitionism for 
engagement.69  
In this sense, the very nature of postmodernism has changed, its landscape altered, and what we are 
now left with is desire and hope. Hope appears to be the central core of what constitutes the 
metamodern aesthetic; however, this is not structurally the point of the movement. It is simply the end 
product of the metamodern drive, which is to constantly persist towards something, a contrasting 
movement away from the melancholic agenda which became rooted in postmodernism. The 
metamodern artist, writer, architect and so on, intentionally persist, striving to reach a future, an 
“unknown goal” that appears to be well and truly forever out of reach. As Vermeulen and Akker 
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explain, “Metamodernism moves for the sake of moving, attempts in spite of its inevitable failure.”70 
In addition to this, the metamodern artist will make this effort deliberately, fully aware of their 
limitations. This awareness is the central point of metamodernism. 
 
Observing Toth’s suggestion that in order to locate the position of the contemporary, there needs to be 
a necessary ‘looking back’ as well as ‘looking forward’. Metamodernism collaborates with this idea, 
observing that the present and the future can never truly be defined or understood by the past, as 
“history’s purpose will never be fulfilled because it does not exist.”71 The concern of the metamodern 
to engage with historical truth is strongly linked to the postmodern conceptualisation of what Linda 
Hutcheon refers to as historiographic metafiction. This concept which grew out of the postmodern 
critique is essentially a call to arms against foundational claims to truth, or history. For Hutcheon, 
historiographic metafictional texts of the postmodern are concerned with challenging the notion that 
historical truth can be conveyed in fictional and literary writing. Postmodern texts such as Vonnegut’s 
Slaughterhouse-Five and J. M. Coetzee’s Foe for example set out to confront the “historical”, or 
historiographical, doing so “both thematically and formally”.72 Hutcheon explains that the agenda of 
this style of postmodern writing is to portray the impossibility of communicating past truths because 
as time presses on, history is altered through varying accounts of that particular past. Hutcheon 
concedes that the past is not necessarily re-laid as false, but that varying accounts and multiple truths 
blur the original location or events of that which is called into question.  
 
Novels which are revealed to be part of this genre of historiographic metafiction, Hutcheon suggests, 
problematize “the very possibility of historical knowledge, because there is no reconciliation, no 
dialectic here – just unresolved contradiction.”73 This style of writing then does not make any such 
claim to truth telling, instead they contradict past novels which do, and they leave the reader inside 
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this space of the unresolved. Where the metamodern differs from historiographic metafiction, is in its 
attempt to reinterpret the past in order to overcome this lack of resolution. It recognizes the position of 
postmodernism which Hutcheon speaks of here, accepts it and yet continues to challenge it. A 
metamodern novel, such as McCarthy’s Remainder or Rhineheart’s The Dice Man, seeks to find 
resolution in spite of the impossible contradiction of articulating the ‘true’ past. Essentially, history 
holds no meaning for the future, and history becomes altogether more problematic for the 
contemporary writer/ artist etc., as it can never be understood to be true in the first place.  
 
The metamodern impulse to overcome can be observed in parallel with that of Hutcheon’s discussion 
concerning the problematic conceptualisation of history in the text. Hutcheon regards postmodernism 
as a position which works “…to contest the very possibility of our ever being able to know the 
“ultimate objects” of the past.”74 Metamodernism on the other hand, having recognized the 
impossibility of the total recall of history, works to know the ‘ultimate objects of the past’ regardless 
of this impossibility. The metamodernist will willingly continue to pursue history’s purpose which 
inevitably remains unobtainable.  
 
In terms of its structure, metamodernism is described by Vermeulen and Akker as an ‘oscillation’ 
between modernism and postmodernism: 
Ontologically, metamodernism oscillates between the modern and the postmodern. It oscillates between a 
modern enthusiasm and a postmodern irony, between hope and melancholy, between naïveté and 
knowingness, empathy and apathy, unity and plurality, totality and fragmentation, purity and ambiguity. 
Indeed, by oscillating to and fro or back and forth, the metamodern negotiates between the modern and the 
postmodern.75   
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This oscillation between these two concepts concentrates the metamodern ‘progression’ of movement 
between the desire to achieve a central purpose and the very nature of limitation. In other words, it is 
between the possibility of modernism, and the infinite of postmodernism where metamodernism is 
situated, and the uncertainty of the oscillation between the two stances becomes the central drive of 
this movement.  
 
Metamodernism then, is both modernism and postmodernism, and at the same time neither of the two, 
or is what Vermeulen and Akker term a form of “metaxis”. Kellner has also suggested that “…it is 
best to envisage the prevailing condition in a zone between the modern and the postmodern.”76 For 
Kellner, this oscillation is perhaps the best available methodology through which to confront the 
uncertainties of the global situation, as it can “deploy a diversity of theories to attempt to capture the 
complexity and conflicts of the contemporary era.”77 For the theory of the metamodern however, this 
oscillation seems to be a consequence, rather than a method. The ‘Meta’ of metamodernism refers 
quite simply to a movement in between modernism and postmodernism, and yet is also a movement 
into the beyond of postmodernism, and “It is influenced by estimations of the past, imbued by 
experiences of the present, yet also inspired by expectations of the future.”78 The focus on future 
progression is a factor which became arguably lost with modernism and postmodernism, and 
metamodernism appears to grow out of a need for continuation, growth and improvement.  
 
A factor that becomes of particular interest to this essay is the similarity between metamodernism and 
neoromanticism, also discussed by Vermeulen and Akker. Neoromanticism, like metamodernism, is 
an emergent form or a re-emerging period of romanticism in contemporary art, and as such will not be 
discussed here in any great detail. However, the comparison between the two forms of contemporary 
culture is the very oscillation between the finite and the infinite. As is explained in ‘Notes on 
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Metamodernism’, “the Romantic attitude can be defined precisely by its oscillation between these two 
poles.”79 Vermeulen and Akker explain that the Romantic is located somewhere between “attempt and 
failure”:  
It is from this hesitation…that the Romantic inclination toward the tragic, the sublime, and the uncanny 
stem, aesthetic categories lingering between projection and perception, form and the unfathomable, 
coherence and chaos, corruption and innocence.80 
For Romanticism, there is a desire to understand the sublime, and at the same time an understanding 
of the impossibility to be able to. Further to this, there is a continuing struggle to make sense of the 
chaotic, within the confined space of such impossibility. It is this very oscillation that is one of the 
primary concerns of my essay. That is, the difficulty of finding meaning in the chaotic and the 
sublime. Metamodernism strives to discover meaning in the meaningless, and it will be shown that in 
the aesthetics of contemporary fiction is located an oscillation between the incomprehensible and the 
desire to comprehend, or as Vermeulen and Akker suggest, the desire “to pursue a horizon that is 
forever receding.”81  
 
A further comparison can be made between metamodernism and what Toth describes as ‘renewalism’. 
Toth investigates the failure of postmodernism and suggests that its demise is centred on an attempt to 
perform a “final act of narrative suicide.”82 By committing to finality, postmodernism ‘falls silent’ and 
ironically becomes the victim of its own ideological structure. According to Toth, this failure has led 
the way for a new period of renewalism, or neo-realism. This rise of renewalism is necessitated by its 
ability to do what postmodernism was unable to, that is its ability to “embrace both the possibility and 
the impossibility of the spectre of modernism.”83 Renewalism embraces the paradox of 
communication through the narrative act of realism: 
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This return to realism is, then, ultimately symptomatic of a broad epistemological renewal of faith – that is, 
faith in the promise of (mimesis, of communication, etc.) and the impossible possibility that it will be 
fulfilled.84  
Renewalism then, is incorporated with Hutcheon’s notion of the postmodern paradox, and is therefore 
a mode of discourse which continuously persists to become the final narrative act, while constantly 
deferring from that possibility. As such it can be seen as being in conjunction with a metamodernist 
oscillation. Essentially, there is no final narrative act, and yet renewalism endorses a continuous faith 
in the persistence of mimesis, knowing all the while that narrative form can never present truth 
without becoming just another “hegemonic ideal”.85 
 
Toth’s observation of the impossible possibility of communication in a new epoch is quite accurate 
when placed alongside the theory of the metamodern, however what seems to be his weakness is his 
critical assessment of the postmodern. He portrays the postmodern as having inadvertently ‘fallen 
silent’ which ultimately led to its apparent end. What is arguably more accurate, as has been observed 
in the discussion of Hutcheon, postmodernism clearly had an agenda which was to ‘fall silent’, so as 
to disrupt communication. John Cage’s 4’33’’ (Four minutes and thirty three seconds) could be 
viewed as an example of postmodernism, in Toth’s terms, ‘falling silent’, and is shown to be centred 
on the postmodern paradox to which Hutcheon refers. As Stephen Davies explains, “There are at least 
two very different ways to view 4’33’’ – as consisting of a passage of absolute silence or as 
comprised of whatever sounds occur during that period.”86 It is at this point that I would like to 
suggest that where the metamodern discourse goes that step further than that of Toth’s analysis of 
renewalism is through both its engagement with and challenge to the postmodern.  
 
                                                          
84 Toth, Passing, p. 119 
85 Toth, Passing, p. 124. 
86 Stephen Davies, ‘John Cage’s 4’33’’: Is it Music?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 4 (1997), pp. 448-462 (p.448). 
34 
 
One example of a metamodern discourse at work would be the contemporary presentation of the 
sublime. As will be shown in the following section, any attempt to deal with the sublime, understand 
it or indeed work through it proves to be quite simply an impossible task. In the same instance trauma, 
or a traumatic event can be shown to be bound up with the sublime and the desire to work through 
trauma in order to recover lost memory becomes problematic. Contemporary portrayals which deal 
with trauma and the sublime, such as McCarthy’s work for example, focus on the impossible 
possibility of representation through narrative, and work in such a way which endorses the oscillation 
of metamodernism. Presenting the unpresentable in presentation itself is a postmodern concept, which 
as has been discussed can be found even further back in history in the writings of Plato for example. 
However, rather than simply exposing the ‘real’ as unpresentable, a metamodern text such as 
McCarthy’s embraces it and attempts to overcome it, knowing that for all intents and purposes it will 
fail. It will be argued that Remainder is a postmodern novel which embraces the metamodern drive; it 
upholds postmodern values and at the same time attempts to challenge them.  
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Part 2. Trauma and the Sublime. 
 
In the previous section I have investigated the concept of metamodernism put forward as a possible 
replacement for the postmodern period. It is at this point that I will now turn to the theory of trauma. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, trauma theory plays a large role in fiction today, and as such I will be 
discussion trauma in relation to Tom McCarthy’s novel Remainder. It is necessary to highlight some 
of the key concepts concerned with trauma theory and it will be equally necessary to investigate the 
relationship between trauma and that of the sublime. I believe that trauma and the sublime are rooted 
together, as both fall into the category of the unpresentable, and by focusing on their structural forms, 
it will become clear that the theory of metamodernism engages with the paradoxical nature of each 
philosophy. Metamodernism seeks to challenge Lyotard’s notion of the postmodern sublime. Lyotard 
makes clear, “We have an idea of the world (the totality of what it is), but we do not have the capacity 
to show an example of it.”87 This dilemma is recognised in the movement of metamodernism. 
However, metamodernism also seeks to challenge it, to ‘present’ the world in spite of its 
unpresentable nature. It works in such a way which has been described as an oscillation between 
modernism and postmodernism; it strives towards a sense of finality, fully aware of its own 
limitations doing so with hope, engagement and faith that a final articulation of truth can be achieved. 
It is this paradoxical movement which can be put forward in any attempt to understand or comprehend 
the nature of trauma and that of the sublime.  
   Tom McCarthy’s Remainder is a novel which is heavily influenced by trauma or the impact of 
trauma upon the subject. With this in mind it is necessary here to investigate the problem of trauma 
before going on to discuss Remainder’s relationship with trauma and indeed that of the sublime. 
McCarthy’s awareness of the unpresentability of trauma suggests that the novel can be viewed as 
embracing the oscillation of the metamodern movement.  
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I: Trauma 
There is a clear comparison to be made between the oscillation of metamodernism and the 
incomprehensibility of trauma. According to Jane Kilby, the study of trauma theory is 
“...characterised by its emphasis on the incomprehensibility of traumatic events…”88 She asserts that 
“social injustices” such as “AIDS, Hiroshima, the Holocaust, sexual abuse, slavery and Vietnam” are 
examples which would constitute the study of trauma theory.89 Trauma theory, then, is the study of 
the after-effects of social and political periods, or events which cannot be understood or 
comprehended.  
 
For the trauma victim, the space of the traumatic event lies rooted in the past, or “later as a haunting 
presence”90 and accessibility to such an event seems tied up with the incapacity to comprehend it. In 
the ‘recalling’ of a traumatic event, it remains distorted, portraying glimpses of the reality of the 
original occurrence. The memory of these events return only as spectral fragments; distorted and 
impeded by time. Ultimately, the actuality of trauma becomes as incomprehensible as that of the event 
that caused it. Further to this, according to Roger Luckhurst, memory is disrupted by trauma, 
particularly with those who suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and because of this 
the identity of the individual also becomes altered in some way.91 The disorder of identity that stems 
from trauma is the result of a breakdown between what the individual considers to be his or her past 
memories and what constitutes their present state of mind: 
Trauma is a piercing or breach of a border that puts inside and outside into a strange communication. 
Trauma violently opens passageways between systems that were once discreet, making unforeseen 
connections that distress or confound. 92 
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Thus, as trauma occurs, the present self becomes disjointed due to the disruption of memory. 
Connections to the past become broken and what is left is the falsification of truth. This then leads to 
the paradox of understanding trauma to which Kilby refers, and as Cathy Caruth suggests, “...the most 
direct seeing of an event may occur as an absolute inability to know it.”93 In this sense, observing an 
event does not necessarily lead to an understanding of it, hence the central paradox of attempting to 
understand trauma. The implications of the nature of trauma distorts the identity of the self, and for 
Sigmund Freud, it is of the upmost importance to recall repressed memories in order to locate or 
reassemble one’s own identity, as Marita Sturken explains, “the “true” nature of one’s self is hidden 
though potentially accessible, and that it must be retrieved in order to produce wholeness.”94 For most 
victims of trauma, it seems that “the ability to recover the past is thus closely and paradoxically tied 
up, in trauma, with the inability to have access to it.”95 With this in mind, it is clear that the paradox of 
trauma can be linked directly to the movement of metamodernism. The desire to comprehend 
something which is incomprehensible mirrors the metamodern drive, which attempts to present truth 
despite an inevitable impossibility to do so.  
 
Truth becomes the most relevant and troubling detail with which trauma is associated. The ability to 
report any truth is exposed as an uneven curve, a direction of thought which Luckhurst attributes to 
Caruth. He suggests that “For Caruth, trauma is… a crisis of representation, of history and truth, and 
of narrative time.”96 History can only be understood as inaccessible, in the very moment that it 
occurs.97 The truth of the past is made problematic and lies completely out of reach through trauma 
and to bear witness to trauma is to bear witness to the incomplete truth about history. As an example, 
the paradox of trauma is acknowledged in the attempt to understand the catastrophic moment in 
history known as Auschwitz. Luckhurst suggests that the ‘crisis of truth’ is a point of concern for 
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German philosopher Theodor W. Adorno, whose thoughts regarding Auschwitz detail the perplexing 
argument of this inaccessibility to the past: 
For Adorno, all Western Culture is at once contaminated by and complicit with Auschwitz, yet the denial of 
culture is equally barbaric. If silence is no option either, Adorno sets art and cultural criticism the severe, and 
paradoxical, imperative of finding ways of representing the unpresentable.98 
In attempts to deal with life, truth, history etc., through mimicry and pastiche, the postmodern, as Toth 
suggests, falls into an abyss of silence. Therefore, it seems that the desire to convey truth, albeit only 
in the knowledge that truth cannot be fully promised, is recognised in metamodernism as an attempt to 
break through the silence which stems from the unreachable depths of trauma. It becomes necessary 
to embrace the unpresentable and not fall silent in the face of that which cannot be explained. 
Metamodernism sets out to be the embodiment of art and cultural criticism to which Luckhurst refers, 
and could be seen as the response to Adorno’s challenge. Postmodernism seeks to present the 
unpresentable, and views silence, emptiness, nihilism and minimalism as the logical outcome. On the 
other hand, metamodernist art seeks to present the unpresentable without falling silent, knowing what 
it says will always fall short of the mark.    
 
Trauma is undoubtedly tied up in the past and therefore in order to overcome and understand trauma, 
one must decidedly reach back into history, regardless of its inaccessibility. This, as will be examined, 
leads to the position and use of repetition as it stands in trauma theory. The constant repetition of past 
events has been regarded as a key element of dealing with trauma. Because traumatic events can never 
be comprehended in the moment of their occurrence, it is only in the future that the impact of their 
effects can be felt, as Caruth explains, “Trauma…does not simply serve as a record of the past but 
precisely registers the force of an experience that is not yet fully owned.”99 For an event to be 
regarded as traumatic, its impact can only be seen to be felt after it has occurred. For Caruth, the 
significance of traumatic influence on one individual, a group, or indeed an entire society cannot be 
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understood or reflected in a study of the event alone, as its manifestations return only as a haunting 
presence.100  
 
The incomprehensibility of trauma is quite simply shown to be the embodiment of how we necessarily 
perceive history, as a distortion that cannot be grasped in its truest form: 
It is indeed this truth of traumatic experience that forms the centre of its pathology or symptoms; it is not a 
pathology, that is, of falsehood or displacement of meaning, but of history itself.101 
History then, becomes as inaccessible as trauma; both are understood by many as complex and 
paradoxical, as they cannot be recognised coherently in a present state. Despite the problems that face 
trauma theorists, what is clear is the necessity to continue the study of trauma. The fact that trauma is 
so incomprehensible suggests just how powerful the effects which grow out of an event can be. The 
incomprehensibility of trauma reveals the reality of traumatic consequences, and the need to pursue 
historical understanding.102 Traumatic reality must be understood if any attempt to recover a sense of 
history or identity is to be achieved. This necessity seems integral to the desire for progression that is 
central to the movement of metamodernism. To advance forward is the compelling attitude that 
inaugurates the contemporary social situation, and as will be suggested, Tom McCarthy’s Remainder 
is an example of this pursuit.  
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II: The Sublime 
The limited nature of the human capacity to understand and come to terms with trauma is mirrored in 
our attempts to comprehend the sublime. What the sublime actually is can be and has been debated 
throughout history. However, the general consensus concerning the existence of the sublime is that it 
is by nature incomprehensible. Immanuel Kant describes the sublime in terms of its sheer size, or 
“quantity”, and that it “is what is large beyond all comprehension.”103 The sublime for Kant is an 
image of unimaginable proportions which the mind cannot visually locate. Further to this, the sublime 
can only be understood in terms of its negative attributes and is usually an image of the natural world: 
It is…in its chaos that nature most arouses our ideas of the sublime, or in its wildness and most ruleless 
disarray and devastation, provided it displays magnitude and might.104  
 Something which is sublime is usually a reflection of the natural world, for if it can be created by 
mankind then it has been imagined by mankind. The sublime therefore, is an estimation of what can 
only be described in terms of its infiniteness. However, what it becomes is not the image itself, but for 
Kant, the “mind of man as he responds to that world and to the feeling that it engenders.”105 It is this 
“response to the infinite” that is the very presentation of what is sublime and our own response to the 
incomprehensible.106  
 
To a greater extent, for Kant at least, the sublime is a conflict of the mind; as the mind attempts to 
negotiate between levels of understanding and levels of incomprehension, it is forced into a struggle 
with infinity.107 The mind is incapable of observing the infinite, and the sublime is the result of its 
continuing attempt to do so. This opinion however, is not absolute, as in Edmund Burke’s 
Philosophical Enquiry, it is suggested that the sublime is not necessarily the response of the mind to 
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something, instead, it is the object of the sublime itself, that as Battersby makes clear, ‘robs’ “the 
spectator of his powers as he was overtaken by the sublime experience.”108 Either way the sublime is 
essentially that which is incomprehensible, revealing a connection to the workings of trauma. Namely, 
the manifestation of trauma at a later date after the initial event can be compared with the conflict of 
the mind as it attempts to observe infinity. In both cases we are left with a conflict of the mind. If the 
sublime can only be deemed truly sublime in the negative sense, agreed upon by both Kant, Burke, 
and as Battersby suggests, Hegel, then a traumatic event can indeed be placed within the realm of the 
sublime. This idea problematizes the notion set out by Kant that the sublime is necessarily part of the 
natural world. Battersby’s discussion of terror and the sublime make it clear that those events such as 
Auschwitz and that which took place in 2001, known as 9/11, can be argued to be sublime in nature.  
 
It will be suggested that Tom McCarthy’s Remainder portrays this attempt to comprehend the infinite 
nature of trauma, and in doing so, also reflects the failure to grasp the overwhelming sense of 
greatness that surrounds the sublime. According to Lyotard, presenting the unpresentable nature of the 
sublime is the agenda set out by postmodernisn, “The postmodern… puts forward the unpresentable in 
presentation itself”.109 In this sense, Remainder embodies the postmodern move to “be witness to the 
unpresentable”,110 and yet at the same time it also seeks to challenge the unpresentable, striving to 
achieve a sense of presentation, all the while aware of the impossibility of such a task.111 However, if 
trauma theory can be shown to have a correlation with the sublime, (the mind attempting to 
comprehend that which is incomprehensible), then both can be understood in correlation with 
metamodernism. They both reflect a central drive to obtain an unreachable truth, a direction which is 
of crucial importance to the metamodern critique. As will be argued, one of the ways in which this 
paradox can be portrayed is through the use of narrative devices such as repetition. McCarthy’s desire 
to embrace and in turn overcome the unpresentable shows both his affinity with postmodernism, and 
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his challenge to it. In Remainder, the metamodern oscillation of presenting the unpresentable can be 
viewed through its engagement with the impact of traumatic reality.    
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Part 3: Tom McCarthy’s Remainder. 
 
It was about history and time, simulation, questions of authenticity and, by extension, of our whole state of 
being-in-the-world. And it was about the world’s state of being-in-the-universe as well: the world, matter, this 
shard left over from some unnameable violent disaster – a remainder.112 
 
In this description of his novel, McCarthy describes Remainder as being a reflection of human 
existence in the current moment. For McCarthy, it seems that Remainder epitomises the postmodern 
condition of questioning previous articulations about the human predicament in a universe of 
unimaginable proportions. It challenges conceptions of reality, breaking them down into fragments 
and deploys postmodern strategies of exposing ‘reality’ as we know it as a set of human constructs. 
Further to this, Remainder is a novel which deals with the postmodern paradox of recalling history, 
and as such, could be viewed as a novel closely related to historiographic metafiction. Similarities 
between McCarthy’s novel and Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five are there to be seen, such as a failure 
to articulate the recollection of historical, traumatic events. Concerning the postmodern text, 
Hutcheon argues that the “contradictions of postmodernism are not really meant to be resolved, but 
rather are to be held in an ironic tension.”113 While it does not identify with a specific event that we 
know of such as the Dresden bombings, it signifies the impossibility of articulating history through 
fiction, particularly in the aftermath of trauma.  
About the accident itself I can say very little. Almost nothing. It involved something falling from the sky. 
Technology. Parts, bits. That’s it, really: all I can divulge. Not much I know.114 
However, where Vonnegut cements the contradiction of recall in his novel, McCarthy strives to 
resolve contradiction, revealing Remainder to be a novel which challenges the postmodern paradox of 
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communication. It could therefore be suggested that Remainder is an embodiment of the metamodern 
novel. Its relationship with irony locates it as a postmodern text; however, it also strives to overcome 
postmodern irresolution situating itself within the metamodern landscape of contemporary literature. 
The postmodern novel, such as Slaughterhouse-Five is concerned with inauthenticity and the loss of 
the real. Remainder’s protagonist, on the other hand, articulates a persistent need to return to a 
position of un-fabricated authenticity. Ironically, he chooses to construct, or reconstruct ‘spaces’ of 
the past so as to achieve this sense of connection to authenticity; “I wanted to reconstruct that space 
and enter it so I could feel real again.”115 Ultimately however, any degree of authenticity becomes 
impossible to hold on to, as Remainder oscillates to-and-fro between success and failure.   
 
 
Remainder portrays the existence of an unnamed protagonist, an ‘everyman’ character who is 
suffering from the trauma of an unknown accident. This accident has left him in a state of physical 
and mental disruption, including the loss of his memory. His very sense of being has been dislodged 
from his previous identity, resulting in his current state of incapacitation. Compensated in the sum of 
eight and a half million pounds, but bound to silence by the settlement agreement, he spends the 
duration of the novel funding repeated attempts to reconnect to his lost reality. These attempts come 
in the form of repetition, or re-enactment, as he tries to rediscover his lost sense of self. At first he sets 
out to build a house that he has fragmented memories of residing in during his ‘past life’. With the 
help of Nazrul Ram Vyas, a hired specialist from a company in the field of facilitation known simply 
as “Time Control UK”, he moulds a large mansion in to the image of his remembered house. He then 
fills his building with hired actors or ‘enactors’ who remain on call to act out the various roles of the 
people from his memories. The narrator, or enactor,116 as he comes to be, re-enacts several other 
staged situations, such as an oil leak from a car at a gas station, the murder of a black man on a 
bicycle and the recreation of a bank robbery.  
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I: Trauma and Repetition in Remainder. 
McCarthy begins his work in the true spirit of ancient Greek literature, in medias res, and the only 
information the reader is given about the unknown event comes from the voice of the highly 
unreliable victim:  
I have vague images, half impressions: of being, or having been – or more precisely, being about to be – 
hit…But who’s to say that these are genuine memories? Who’s to say that my traumatized mind didn’t just 
make them up, or pull them out from somewhere else…Minds are versatile and wily things. Real 
chancers.117 
This “accident” is never described, and remains an unknown event that has occurred before the story 
begins. The reader is confronted from the start with the problem of absence, and as such the ‘non-
event’ is emphasised in the text immediately. In this sense, Remainder is what LaCapra would call 
non-conventional, as it displays the event as “abstract” or “disembodied” completely from the plot.118 
It exists as subconscious; a sub-category for the carrying out of its consequences as the narrator omits 
the event due to the impact of trauma. PTSD is vividly conveyed in the characterisation of 
Remainder’s narrator, whose disjointed identity has come to be as a result of his catastrophe. On the 
other hand, it is possible that the terms of the settlement of his compensation fee prevent him from 
discussing the accident, even to the reader, as he does in fact admit; “…then there’s the Requirement. 
The Clause. The terms of the Settlement…prohibiting me from discussing, in any public or recordable 
format…the nature and/ or details of the incident…”119 From the outset, then, Remainder distances 
itself from historical accuracy, aligning itself with the postmodern approach to presenting the 
unpresentable. Clarity is questioned in the postmodern, as Hutcheon makes clear: 
In the postmodern writing of history – and fiction – there is a deliberate contamination of the historical with 
didactic and situational discursive elements, thereby challenging the implied assumptions of historical 
statements: objectivity, neutrality, impersonality, and transparency of representation.”120  
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Transparency is never fulfilled in Remainder and as such, McCarthy’s work clearly shows itself to be 
aware of and in league with the problematic concept of ‘re-telling’ that Hutcheon associates with the 
postmodern.  
 
In section one, it was suggested that PTSD is a side-effect of the traumatic experience, and according 
to Luckhurst, as memory becomes disrupted, the identity of the victim can take on a new form. In the 
novel, the narrator’s memories have been rearranged, quite literally altering his perspective on life: 
After the accident I forgot everything. It was as though my memories were pigeons and the accident a big 
noise that had scared them off. They fluttered back eventually – but when they did, their hierarchy had 
changed, and some that had had crappy places before ended up with better ones: I remembered them more 
clearly; they seemed more important.121 
The narrator’s disordered memories represent the impact of the traumatic event, and as a result, his 
identity is relocated onto a new plateau of existence. Further to this, his rearranged identity is 
reflected in the text through narrative disruption and what Zadie Smith suggests is a “nervous 
breakdown’ of the text, as the narrator constantly becomes confused in his descriptions of things and 
people.122 Having described a conversation with a homeless man in a cafe, he then reveals that this 
conversation never actually took place. “The truth is, I’ve been making all this up – the stuff about the 
homeless person. He existed alright…but I didn’t go across to him.”123 This narrative breakdown 
mirrors his overall view of the constructed world, and the “Usurpers” and “Frauds” within it.124 As 
with most victims of trauma, it is through the process of repetition that McCarthy’s narrator attempts 
to ‘work through’ his dislodged identity in order to reconnect to his lost sense of self.125. In parallel to 
the postmodern, the “repetition compulsion” also exists upon a resounding paradox, as Oliver makes 
clear, it allows the victim to tolerate their trauma, all the while “falsifying” the event, “which one tries 
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repeatedly to pin down, to nail, in language and image replay.”126 Repetition occurs as an attempt by 
the victim to comprehend the incomprehensible trauma and reassemble personal dislocation.127  
 
The narrator’s failure to disclose the nature of the event to the reader from within the fictional world, 
alongside the breakdown of the narration reveals McCarthy’s intentions to mark the fictive space as 
imperfect for historical accuracy. This effort is paramount to the postmodern writing of 
historiographic metafiction, which questions traditional forms of narrating history through fiction, as 
Hutcheon explains: 
Historiographic metafiction… keeps distinct its formal auto-representation and its historical context, and in 
doing so problematizes the very possibility of historical knowledge, because there is no reconciliation, no 
dialectic here – just unresolved contradiction.”128   
Remainder is clearly located on this position of ‘unresolved contradiction’, however, in the same 
instance it also deviates from it. It is a novel which recognizes the paradox of postmodernism, and 
even goes so far as recapturing it, and yet it also attempts to dispel it.  
 
McCarthy’s protagonist is never content with irresolution, of falling into the ‘unresolved 
contradiction’ of the postmodern. Instead he seeks out “miracles” and desires to “triumph over 
matter”.129 He continuously attempts to reconnect with his past and return to a state of wholeness. In 
this sense, Remainder conveys to its reader the oscillation of the metamodern movement, constantly 
attempting to overcome that which can never be resolved. It encapsulates the ironic of the 
postmodern, but is determined to gravitate beyond it; a central paradox of the novel in which 
McCarthy displays an incessant need to articulate the reality of trauma, even if this is never 
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possible.130 Ultimately however, any sense of overcoming the narrator’s trauma would be something 
of a false truth claim. Concerning Hutcheon’s discussion of historiographic metafiction in postmodern 
novels, Remainder reveals itself to be in conjunction with this style of writing, and yet it also shows a 
desire to challenge the impossible nature of communication, doing so through the process of 
repetition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
130 Oliver suggests that in regards to trauma, one must attempt to articulate it to the best of one’s own ability. 
49 
 
II: Making Connections. 
Following on from the initial incident which leaves him in a comatose state, the unnamed anti-hero or 
“everyman”131 is guided by his doctors to achieving recovery. His brain undergoes a process of 
“rerouting”132 which involves a rewiring of his brain circuits that have been damaged in order to carry 
out even the most simplest of tasks, such as “lifting a carrot”. This of course never enables him to 
recapture his original self, as what has replaced his state of existence before the accident has now 
become manufactured and unreal. He views the carrot as having more of a reality than he does; “The 
carrot, though, was more active than me: the way it bumped and wrinkled, how it crawled with grit. It 
was cold.”133 ‘Rerouting’ becomes the core of the text, as repeated attempts to feel are executed. 
Because his sense of being has been cut off from reality, he attempts to reconnect to his own identity 
through a series of re-enactments. Working as conduits for the repetition process, these re-enactments 
allow the protagonist his attempts to become real, to return to his lost place of authenticity. Repetition 
in Remainder then, becomes an attempt to retrieve what Gilles Deleuze refers to as “unknown 
knowledge”. For Deleuze, it is the act of repetition itself which constitutes the unknown knowledge, 
and in order to understand this knowledge, the ‘hero’ of the play-world must act it out, “play it and 
repeat it until the acute moment that Aristotle called “recognition””.134 Thus, McCarthy’s enactor 
moulds spaces for himself, stage locations, in which he can ‘act out’ his ‘unknown knowledge.’ 
 
His desire to achieve a connection to reality is first realised during a visit to the bathroom at a friend’s 
party, where upon discovering a crack in the wall, he experiences a strong sensation of “déjà vu”.135 
This sensation could be envisaged as an Aristotelian recognition of a memory prior to his accident, 
and up until this point, he has not recognised any moment from his pre-traumatic episode. The 
memory is of a house which he may or may not have inhabited at some point during his life, possibly 
in Paris. Although only a distorted memory, it is an instance of complete realisation, and an un-
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fabricated connection to his reality. From this crack he is able to picture the very makeup of the 
building and the people inside it. More importantly however, he is able to recall “how all this had 
felt.”136 He remembers these feelings as being genuinely natural, not forced, such as the movements of 
his now altered self: 
Most of all I remembered this: that inside this remembered building, in the rooms and on the staircase, in the 
lobby and the large courtyard between it and the building facing with the red roofs with black cats on them – 
that in these spaces, all my movements had been fluid and unforced. Not awkward, acquired, second hand, 
but natural.137 
During this memory or flashback, he finds joy in the notion that at this time his movements were 
‘seamless’ and unimpeded by contemplation. He is able to see himself as he views Robert De Niro in 
Mean Streets, “Whether it was lighting up a cigarette or opening a fridge door…he seemed to execute 
the action perfectly…He’s natural when he does things. Not artificial, like me.”138 It is at this moment 
of realisation where he makes the decision to invest his new found wealth into the reconstruction of 
this building, down to each and every minute detail. “I was going to recreate it: build it up again and 
live inside it”.139  
 
The connections which McCarthy’s enactor makes in the novel, that connect him to what he believes 
to be his reality, are described several times throughout the novel as a “tingling” sensation, brought on 
by either having an actual memory from before his accident, or at the sight of a perfect, seamless 
moment. During the early stages of the novel, a memory of “just before the accident” provides him 
with this sensation. He remembers “…being buffeted by the wind. Remembering it sent a tingling 
from the top of my legs to my shoulders and right up into my neck.”140 He seeks this intense feeling 
through his re-enactments by confronting his ‘neutral’ existence. The “tingling” is a moment of 
perfection for him; “It lasted for just a moment, but while it did, I felt not-neutral. I felt different, 
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intense: both intense and serene at the same time.”141 On a symbolic level, these sensations act as 
moments of epiphany. Through these connections he is able to find himself outside, or above the 
pretension and the plastic substance that he now views as life, away from the “media types” and the 
“scene gays”, whom he describes as “Theatrical, made up, the lot of them.”142  
 
The narrator’s obsession with connecting to reality is later portrayed in his observation of workmen 
on a street laying wires. “They were connecting wires to one another: blue, red and green ones, 
making the connections. I watched them, fascinated.”143 The actions of making connections become 
for him the most important act in his now altered life. Everything he does revolve around authenticity 
and it is the perfection of this ironically mechanical function that drives him. Despite his resentment 
towards his physical and mental incapacitation, he is spurred on by becoming mechanically perfect, 
and as he watches the workmen making connections, he holds them on a pedestal, as gatekeepers to 
his desired place of perfect movement: “For me, they were Brahmins: top of the pile. More than 
Brahmins: Gods, laying down the wiring of the world, then covering it up – its routes, its joins.”144 He 
envies these ‘Brahmins’ for their supremacy, as he desires to be like them, a ruler over matter, as 
perfection becomes his one true goal.  
 
His dissatisfaction with imperfection is made clear when he is told of the amount of money he will 
receive as compensation for his accident: 
 I thought about the sum: eight and a half million. I pictured it in my mind, its shape. The eight was perfect, 
neat: a curved figure infinitely turning back into itself. But then the half. Why had they added the half? It 
seemed to me so messy, this half: a leftover fragment, a shard of detritus. When my knee-cap had set after 
being shattered in the accident, one tiny splinter had stayed loose. The doctors hadn’t managed to fish it out, 
so it just floated around beside the ball, redundant, surplus to requirements…I remember the sum’s leftover 
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fraction, the half…picturing it as the splinter in my knee, and frowning, thinking: Eight alone would have 
been better.145   
The dislodged fragment symbolises his displacement from reality after the accident. There are many 
examples within the text which can be said to be McCarthy’s Remainder, and this “half” leftover is 
one of them. As Julia Jordan suggests, “The debris of the accident in McCarthy’s novel – the 
remainder of Remainder itself – is described in the novel as ‘like a shard’, leaving its mark…”146 By 
re-enacting lost memories, the narrator attempts to return to wholeness, to an existence of perfect, 
seamless movement.  
 
The re-enactments which take place in the renovated Madlyn Mansions are focussed around the 
narrator’s interactions with hired ‘enactors’ who portray the people of his possible past, such as his 
interaction with the liver lady on the fifth floor. His desire is to achieve the recreation of a past 
exchange with the original liver lady. 
We’d spent ages practising this moment. I’d showed her exactly how to stoop: the inclination of her 
shoulders…the way her hand rested on her lower back above the hip, the middle finger pointing straight at 
the ground. We’d got all this down to a t…147 
 However, having rehearsed this interaction with her, going over each detail meticulously, the way she 
must stand, or hold her bag of rubbish as she opens her door, it is by chance that the unrehearsed 
words which pass between them fit perfectly into the overall recreation of this moment. The narrator 
is hit by a moment of euphoria as the liver lady describes the bag as, “Harder and harder to lift up.”148 
As these words are uttered without meditation, without having been previously attempted or 
discussed, he feels his connection: 
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For a few seconds, I felt weightless – or at least differently weighted: light but dense at the same time. My 
body seemed to glide fluently and effortlessly through the atmosphere around it – gracefully, slowly, like a 
dancer through water. It felt good. As I reached the third or fourth step of this new flight, though, this feeling 
dwindled. By the fifth or sixth it was gone.149  
The connection does not last long, and ultimately, he is never able to achieve the same euphoric 
feeling again, despite continuous attempts to repeat this exact moment with the liver lady enactor; “I 
just felt like doing it again and again and again. Hundreds of times.”150 Something always happens to 
make the moment between them less than perfect, less than seamless.  
 
However, as his addiction to this connection grows, his re-enactments become increasingly more 
severe; “I’d gone to these extraordinary lengths in order to be real.”151 In the recreation of the bank 
heist, the stage and reality become blended together. This re-enactment becomes more than just a 
stage to carry out a re-enactment; it becomes a reality, as one of the enactors involved discovers, “It’s 
real!”152 During this re-enactment, McCarthy portrays the true spectacle of the simulacrum, in 
Baudrillard’s terms. Baudrillard asks the question, how does one simulate a fake heist of a bank 
robbery? The answer is simply that one cannot, as “…the web of artificial signs will be inextricably 
mixed up with real elements” and “you will unwittingly find yourself immediately in the real.”153 
Rather than merely representing reality in the recreation of a robbery, an actual robbery is created, 
one that does not symbolize anything more than what it is. This re-enactment does not represent 
reality on a stage of inauthenticity; it becomes a reality which precedes representation, and as such 
displays the protagonist’s fall into a world or existence without origin. It is at this point that he now 
functions in a hyperreality altogether, where the real and the imaginary are no longer distinct from one 
another. To a certain degree, this is exactly what he desires, to exist in a world unimpeded by 
fabrication. However, it is at this point that he is confronted with the paradox of the real, and 
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McCarthy here demonstrates what Baudrillard refers to as an “impossibility of isolating the process of 
simulation”.154 His reality is not a reality at all. Instead, it is a fabricated ‘space’, an illusion which 
continues to destabilise the further he enters into it. The simulated heist inevitably becomes real, but 
for the protagonist, there is no longer a distinction between what is real and what is simulation.               
 
What of course becomes his main obstacle in the recreation of these events, is that the only times he is 
able to achieve the feeling of “zinging and intensity”,155 the connection to an elevated state, is when 
something happens by accident, and it becomes the perfection of the accident, the uncontrolled, that 
dominates and produces meaning for him. As Jordan suggests, Remainder is “saturated with 
accidents, collisions and arcing parabolas.”156 In Remainder, the narrator maintains a central drive to 
make things happen through repetition, thus deviating from the accidental world. McCarthy portrays 
an attempt to disrupt the tendencies of the accidental by taking control of unpredictability, as Jordan 
asserts, the actions, re-enactments of the protagonist “represent an attempt …to fundamentally cease 
these errant and disruptive movements.”157 These movements are the accidental, the unpredictable 
aspects of movement of space and time. The narrator is of course never able to fully acquire this 
control, as “the fold in the carpet, regardless of your accounting for it (or whether or not it exists) will 
always trip you up and make you fall.”158 The repetition of events, of the re-enactments, conveys to 
the reader the attempt to control his personal trauma, to escape it. However, as has been suggested, 
repetition does not necessarily lead to recovery. It is simply the process by which the trauma victim 
must proceed with, a compulsion, that is, to continuously attempt to comprehend and understand that 
which is incomprehensible. As will be discussed, this attempt can be seen as an attempt to 
comprehend the incomprehensible nature of the sublime.  
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III: Masks, Perfection and Infinite Loops.  
For McCarthy’s novel, it is on the symbolic level that repetition is at its most powerful and it is worth 
discussing some of the symbolic elements in the novel which conjure up the feeling of perfection for 
the protagonist. An image of particular importance is the role of ‘masks’ in the novel. On the surface 
of the text, the use of the mask functions as a replacement for memory. For example, McCarthy’s 
enactor is unable to remember the face of the concierge from his memory of the house, and so he 
places a mask on the face of her re-enactor: 
The concierge re-enactor was standing by in the lobby, while one of the costume people fiddled with the 
strappings of her face mask. Her face had never come to me – or, to be precise, it had come to me but only as 
a blank – so I decided she should wear a mask to blank it out. We’d got one of those masks that ice-hockey 
goaltenders wear: white and pocketed with little breathing holes.159  
In addition to this image as a representation of a blank face, connotations of the stage are also invoked 
here. Discussing the use of masks in the novel, McCarthy himself insists, “I was thinking of Greek 
Tragedy.”160 The repetition on display in the pages of the text is in this case taking place on the stage 
or in a play. The narrator has created for himself a ‘space’, resembling that of a stage, one in which he 
may take control over and dominate, as he is able to move in and out of each space as he chooses, “I 
shall move throughout the space…as I see fit.”161 Concerning the process of repetition, Deleuze 
suggests that: 
When we say… that movement is repetition and that this is our true theatre, we are not speaking of the effort 
of the actor who “repeats” because he has not yet learned the part. We have in mind the theatrical space, and 
the manner in which it is filled and determined by the signs and masks through which the actor plays a role 
which plays other roles.162 
The repetition portrayed in Remainder is done so on a fictional stage which the narrator creates for 
himself and which McCarthy creates for the reader.  
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For Deleuze, repetition is not the embodiment of what has been forgotten or lost, it is the symbolic, 
the simulacra of knowledge about the unknown object.163 Deleuze suggests that repetition is acted out 
unconsciously, or in the case of Remainder’s narrator, subconsciously. For him, what has been lost 
through traumatic injury can only be experienced once again through repeating and then re-repeating, 
inside a space which marks the place of recovery. The actual act of repetition set on this recreated 
stage, and the masks he fills it with, become a simulation of his desire to force a connection. The 
mask acts as a sign, a symbol of the unknown object, and the physical movement involved with acting 
portrays the mental attempt to comprehend it, or retrieve it, as Deleuze goes on to add: 
When the subconscious of knowledge or the working through of memory is missing, the knowledge in itself 
is the only repetition of its object: it is played, that is to say repeated, enacted instead of being known. 
Repetition here appears as the unconscious of the free concept, of knowledge or of memory, the unconscious 
of representation.164 
Repetition in Remainder then, represents that which is unknown, and the unknown is therefore the 
narrator’s lost knowledge. Because he cannot remember that which he has lost, his attempts to 
reconnect are acted out, quite literally on a stage which he creates, for the process of repetition.  
 
However, repetition does not necessarily lead to recovery and as will be discussed here, it is the act of 
repetition which resembles the attempt to grasp at the incomprehensible nature of infinity in spite of 
the impossibility of fully comprehending it. This paradox of repetition is portrayed heavily in the 
symbolic elements of Remainder, and yet it is only by accident that a connection to knowledge can be 
made. In fact, it is arguable that the strongest connection in the novel is made when the narrator finds 
himself embracing the behaviour of a homeless person on the street: 
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I stood there static with my hands out, palms turned upwards, while commuters streamed past me. After a 
while I decided that I would ask them for change…I didn’t need or want their change…I just wanted to be in 
that particular space, right then, doing that particular action. It made me feel so serene and intense that I felt 
almost real.165 
McCarthy throws away all aspects of idealism here, conjuring up an ‘almost’ complete and perfect 
connection to reality. The narrator is down to the bare bones of simplicity, without any illusions of 
artificiality, for a few minutes at least. He takes on the form of a homeless person in the eyes of the 
unreal passers-by, and yet he feels a sensation of belonging to this space in time. It is the closest he 
comes to perfection, if only for a moment, and is the only space in the novel which he himself does 
not create which conjures up his connection to reality. Remainder’s association with the illusion of 
reality and the representation of the real in the constructed space positions it within the realm of the 
postmodern. However, its disassociation from the constructed space, presented in the accidental 
subverts the novel from postmodern tendencies, challenging the illusion of reality. In this sense, it is a 
novel which both embraces the paradox of representation and attempts to go against it. This challenge 
is presented in the enactor’s connection to authenticity by way of chance happenings.   
 
 
McCarthy’s enactor in Remainder finds a sense of comfort in the idea of perfection. This comfort 
however becomes more and more heavily rooted in the text through his overwhelming addiction to 
making his connection. The narrator finds a sense of liberation in observing the methodical 
movements that occur throughout the novel, such as observing the workmen connecting wires. His 
obsession with rhythm and connecting movement is repeated in the way he observes his assembled 
team as they search for an appropriate house to stage his re-enactments. He comes to the conclusion 
that they will not find the house and yet he prefers them to keep looking anyway: 
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Why hadn’t I called the search off, then? You might ask. Because I liked the process, liked the sense of 
pattern. There were people running through the same, repetitive acts – consulting their mobiles, walking up 
one street, down the next and up a third, stopping in front of buildings to make phone calls – in six different 
parts of town. Their burrowing would get inside the city’s block and loosen it, start chiselling away at 
surplus matter: it would scare my building out, like beaters scaring pheasants out of bushes for a Lord to 
shoot – six beaters advancing in formation, beating to the same rhythms, their movement duplicating one 
another.166 
His addiction to perfect rhythm and movement is clear in this extract, as is his drive for power, as he 
describes himself as a “Lord”, a commander over his subjects. McCarthy places his narrator in a 
bird’s eye position of power, observing movement being carried out across the city.  
 
This observation is comparable to his enjoyment of the methodical search for truth in the aftermath of 
a murder; “Forensic procedure is an art form, nothing less. No, I’ll go further: it’s higher, more 
refined, than any art form. Why? Because it’s real.”167 In describing this process he reveals his desire 
for complete perfection: “The whole process is extremely formal: you don’t just go ahead and do it – 
you do it slowly, breaking down your movements into phases that have sections and sub-sections, 
each one governed by rigorous rules.”168 What started out as simply a desire to make connections 
becomes an addiction to control, as the narrator searches for perfection, to rid every factor of his life 
of any evidence of ‘surplus matter’. On a symbolic level, he views everything as rotating on an 
infinite loop or axis. He compares this rotation to the chamber of a gun, “Guns aren’t just history’s 
props and agents: they’re history itself, spinning alternate futures in their chamber, hurling the present 
from their barrel, casting aside the empty shells of the past.”169 He reveals his addiction to be a way of 
perfecting his control over time, an obsession of paradoxical impossibility.  
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Just like his discomfort with the half a million pounds left over in his compensation settlement, he 
seeks the perfection of the infinite loop in the forensic procedure of the murder; “…if I were a head 
investigator, I’d plump for a figure of eight, and have each of my people crawl round the same area in 
an endlessly repeating circuit.”170 Once again, he imagines himself as this ‘God-like’ image observing 
his people crawling on all fours. What is important concerning this discussion is the loop of infinity, 
this “figure of eight” which remains ultimately the structure of the entire novel. The infinite is of 
impossible proportions and the narrator will never truly grasp its impossibility, and yet he continues 
his search for it. Remainder’s quest for finality, in spite of a knowing impossibility of capturing its 
perfection reveals its relationship with the metamodern. It is a novel which oscillates between 
enthusiasm and irony, hurling forward but forever turning back in on itself. Remainder’s concern for 
the image of the infinite loop, the figure of eight, reflects the metamodern movement.  
 
The narrator’s fascination with infinity is also portrayed throughout the novel in the symbolic image 
of the loyalty card which he uses when paying for coffee. Interestingly, McCarthy provides the reader 
with an image of a well-known example of Western consumerism in order to emphasise this repetitive 
movement:    
If I got all ten of its cups stamped then I’d get an extra cup – plus a new card with ten more cups on it. The 
idea excited me: clocking the counter, going right round through zero, starting again.171  
The image of coffee cup stamps is used several times throughout the novel and acts as a kind of 
symbolic gesture, displaying the protagonist’s desire for perfection. He is compelled by the movement 
of progression, the symmetry of its circular movement. It is something which he can control, thus 
enabling him to find meaning in spite of his own uncertainty. As previously discussed, this circular 
image reinforces the structure of Remainder and the constant loop of infinity which serves as the 
overall journey of the central character announces his fascination, or obsession, with the notion of 
perfection, or rather, his desire to embody the unattainable. Further to this, his satisfaction with the 
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coffee cup left over can be seen as being in stark contrast to his dissatisfaction with the terms of the 
settlement, thus reinforcing Smith’s notion of the narrative breakdown of the text. 
 
It can also be suggested that his desire for perfection in the novel mirrors the notion of comprehending 
the sublime. The narrator appears to embrace the paradoxical nature of the sublime in his quest for 
perfection. Discussing this paradox, Battersby refers to the Kantian notion of the sublime, which 
suggests that the pleasure the mind receives as it responds to the sublime is “generated by discord, 
through conflict…as man’s senses, imagination and emotions function disharmoniously –trying to 
grasp an infinity or a power that is too great for comprehension.”172 McCarthy appears to portray the 
mind’s response to the ungraspable entity of the paradoxical nature of the sublime. The repetitive acts 
on show in Remainder’s constructed spaces mimic the attempt to contemplate the “purposeless shape” 
of the sublime,173 a shape which appears to resemble the ‘figure of eight’ loop of infinity.  
 
McCarthy’s novel initiates a concern for the unidentifiable, fully conscious of its own inadequacy or 
inability to present truth and it is this failure that Lyotard speaks of in regards to the postmodern 
presentation of the sublime. Lyotard observes that it “takes place…when the imagination fails to 
present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept.” He explains that: 
We can conceive the infinitely great, the infinitely powerful, but every presentation of an object destined to 
“make visible” this absolute greatness of power appears to us painfully inadequate. Those are ideas of which 
no presentation is possible.174 
For Lyotard, the postmodern sublime can be summed up by a certain failure to portray reality, and 
must inevitably portray only an illusion of it. However, for the metamodernist, there is an embrace of 
this incapacity to comprehend the sublime, to continue to attempt to understand that which cannot be 
understood, in spite of a certain inevitable failure to be able to do so. In this sense, it can be suggested 
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that McCarthy’s Remainder embraces the paradoxical nature of the sublime, embodying a 
metamodern portrayal of articulation which is ultimately destined to fail. Infinity for the narrator 
becomes an impossible goal, which he continuously seeks to obtain through the repetitive process of 
working through his personal trauma. 
 
McCarthy illustrates the Freudian concept of ‘working through’ in the use of repetition in the novel, 
portraying his protagonist journeying through the text as a trauma patient under psychoanalytical 
treatment. As a patient, the narrator continuously repeats, revealing his attempt to remember what 
Deleuze refers to as lost knowledge. Freud explains that “As long as the patient is in the treatment he 
cannot escape from this compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand that this is a way of 
remembering.”175 Unfortunately for the narrator, and indeed for the trauma victim, the act of repetition 
becomes paradoxical, as rather than allowing the patient to remember, repetition takes the place of 
remembering. Repetition initially occurs in order to remember, however it then becomes a 
replacement for recall, as Freud makes clear, “(repetition) replaces remembering.”176 In this sense, the 
narrator attempts to master his personal trauma through repetition, and yet he is confronted with each 
act of repetition by a central paradox; as he repeats, he is not remembering at all, instead he is creating 
a space of illusion where all his attempts to comprehend the incomprehensible nature of his personal 
trauma are isolated. As such, “remembering at once gives way to acting out”.177 The act of repetition 
is as Deleuze suggests symbolic.178 It allows for the lived-in experience of trauma but only in a 
simulated state, and cannot be comparable to the real. Because of this, Remainder’s narrator is an 
embodiment of the metamodern hero, who commits to the impossible and is caught within a 
paradoxical loop of continuously striving to overcome the incomprehensible.  
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   In the final pages of the text, McCarthy merges his narrator’s attempt to connect to reality by 
obtaining perfection with the notion of comprehending the impossible sublime. Following the bank 
robbery, that becomes more than just a re-enactment, the protagonist hijacks a plane, forcing it to fly 
“back and forth in mid-air.”179 As the novel concludes, the narrator seems to have finally made a 
lasting connection as the plane leaves a figure of eight trail of smoke in the sky; “Our trail would be 
visible from the ground: an eight, plus that bit where we’d first set off – fainter, drifted to the side by 
now, discarded, recidual, a remainder.”180 He is at last where he wishes to be, in a heightened position 
of control, embodying the very movement of the paradoxical infinite loop, moving forward and 
turning back, and he is hit once again by the intense “feeling of weightlessness”.181 Ultimately 
however, the reader knows that this cannot last, that in the end, the plane must return to the ground, 
returning the novel back in on itself, back to the start, with the falling of a large object from the sky, 
bringing to an end the narrator’s perfectly seamless connection to the infinite nature of the sublime. 
 
Through Remainder, McCarthy presents a contemporary depiction of the traumatic mind, as it 
searches for meaning in spite of an uncertain existence. His narrator is compelled forward by his 
desire to obtain a sense of meaning where there is no such thing, and his actions are presented in the 
form of repetition. Speaking in regards to the repetition compulsion after trauma, of multiple texts 
which continuously repeat in order to overcome trauma, Slavoj Žižek argues that: 
the endlessly repeated reenactments refer to the trauma of some impossible Real which forever resists its 
symbolization (all these different narratives are ultimately just so many failures to cope with this trauma, 
with the contingent abyssal occurrence of some catastrophic Real, like suicide, apropos of which no ‘why’ 
can ever serve as its sufficient explanation).182 
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 The re-enactments that occur throughout Remainder are displayed in the protagonist’s attempt at 
working through trauma, in order to reach a state of recovery. McCarthy takes this a step further 
however, examining the paradoxical workings of the repetition process, revealing that trauma can 
never be wholly overcome. This notion is placed alongside the image of the infinite loop, as 
Remainder presents the mind’s attempt to comprehend the incomprehensible nature of the sublime. It 
is in this way that Remainder can be said to embrace the paradox of repetition, and indeed that of the 
sublime, and in so doing, reveals its connection to the postmodern concern for the impossible.  
 
McCarthy’s desire to overcome this impossibility suggests however that the novel functions beyond 
the postmodern, as it navigates its way into the metamodern landscape. Despite the fact that trauma 
can never be overcome, the process of repetition, of continuously re-enacting in order to make a 
lasting connection to truth, reality and in order to overcome the unknown traumatic event, McCarthy’s 
novel articulates the metamodern drive to embrace the impossible nature of traumatic reality.  
Remainder becomes a fragmented guide to the mind of mankind, its existence in a world of 
uncertainty, and the world’s existence in a universe of unimaginable proportions; a “black hole” of 
space-time.183 In addition to this, McCarthy produces a novel which plainly observes the unstable 
relationship between victim and reality. Remainder ultimately portrays an impossible attempt to grasp 
at or reconnect with a reality which no longer exists and it reveals itself to be a metamodern text 
which both encompasses and challenges postmodern values of presentational failure. Through 
Remainder, McCarthy presents the notion that an image of progressive movement forwards, towards a 
‘forever receding horizon’184 cannot be controlled. It is only by accident, or chance, that his enactor 
ever truly gets close to making his final connection – an end as it were – and the function of chance in 
contemporary fiction, it will be discussed, can be said to be another tactic of the metamodern drive.  
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Part 4. Chance and Luke Rhineheart’s The Dice Man. 
 
In the previous chapter it was discussed that Tom McCarthy’s Remainder can be viewed as an 
example of metamodernist fiction. It is a novel which captures the fundamental aspects of the 
metamodern drive, such as the desire for authenticity in an uncertain world. Luke Rhineheart’s The 
Dice Man is another novel which embraces the paradoxical oscillation of metamodernism. This early 
1970’s novel operates around the notion of chance, as Rhineheart portrays the main protagonist, 
himself, playing out his life based upon the roll of the dice. It will be suggested in this chapter that 
Rhineheart’s work can be included as a work of the metamodern alongside McCarthy’s Remainder. I 
would like to argue here that chance, as it stands in the fictional world of Rhineheart’s novel, is used 
and presented in a metamodern way. I would also like to make it clear at this point that when I use the 
term ‘chance’, I am not using it in regards to the accidental, as the two stand as separate categories in 
and of themselves. In Remainder for example, McCarthy puts forward the reaction of his protagonist 
to the accidental ‘chance’ happenings that were out of his control, and ultimately unpredictable only 
because he did not see them coming. In this sense, Remainder concerns itself with the notion of pure 
accident. In The Dice Man however, chance is used in a controlled manner by the protagonist and 
cannot be deemed to be seen as accidental. An object that falls from the sky which lands on a person 
causing traumatic repercussions can only be seen as accidental, unless of course it was done on 
purpose, whereas the fall of the dice from a player’s hand is a deliberate submission to the powers of 
fate, a submission to the realm of pure chance. 
 
In The Dice Man there is on show a certain desire to discover a sense of freedom, whether it be a 
physical freedom from the constraints of social normality, or a desire for moral freedom existentially. 
According to Gerda Reith, Rhineheart’s main protagonist plays out the “ultimate existential fantasy 
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by surrendering his life’s decisions to the role of the dice.”185  The outcome of course is that this 
freedom cannot be attained once and for all, and so the novel appears to resemble the metamodern 
drive for freedom in spite of its overwhelming and unreachable distance. What is metamodern about 
the text is its oscillation between achieving a sense of personal progression (freedom) and its return to 
the space of confinement. The Dice Man reflects upon the paradox of existence, examining the 
uncertain notion of identity. What the reader is able to observe is the continuous strive to achieving 
the totality of self-hood, or self-expression, when ultimately, a true presentation of the self is forever 
unachievable.  
 
Rhineheart’s novel is a fictional portrayal which follows the life of one Dr Luke Rhineheart, a 
psychiatrist who decides to experiment with dice. In order to free himself from the confined existence 
of routine, implemented by the workforce, by modern society, and by the trivialities of marriage and 
family life, he takes it upon himself to leave every decision, every action of his life up to the fate of 
the dice. As the novel unfolds, his existence becomes one with the notion of fate. He becomes no 
longer in control of what he does or says, as he follows every order that the dice compels him to 
undertake. This of course leads to his displacement from the world of social normality, and he 
eventually becomes a fugitive on the run from the law. Already there is an obvious comparison to be 
made between the fictional Luke Rhineheart and Remainder’s protagonist, whom also delves into a 
world without consequences. Living by the dice is an experiment “to change human personality.”186  
 
For Rhineheart, and by Rhineheart I refer here to the fictional one alone, human personality is 
restricted by social expectations, and most of the true aspects of the self, of which of course there are 
indeed many, are kept in place below the surface of that which we see day to day. The true desires of 
the human mind are repressed, ideologically for the purposes of carrying out certain functions which 
maintain a continuous yet unchanging social workforce which does not stray from the repetitive, 
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ordered and most importantly controlled existence of life. For Rhineheart, man is controlled and his 
true desires, his true selves which are kept below the surface are repressed, resulting in an incomplete 
personality. Lakoff and Johnson explain that “The study of the self…concerns the structure of our 
inner lives, who we really are.”187 Dice Life is an attempt to experience who we really are, the chaotic 
and the random, all-encompassing and unidentifiable nature of the human mind. Rhineheart reveals 
that by embracing chance, or the gamble, one is able to commit to the impossible task of achieving 
true freedom. However, in the same instance, the protagonist is faced with the paradox of freedom 
through chance, as he becomes indoctrinated into the ideology of the die, the religion of it, and it is 
during this indoctrination that he becomes subject to its will.  
 
Examples of these true desires to which Rhineheart refers to in the novel are not in any way easy to 
comprehend, such as the desire to rape, murder, or to commit suicide. For some at least, such as a 
psychiatrist’s patients for example, these are desires of the hidden personalities of the mind, which are 
quite simply not allowed to be explored, or acted out in reality: 
Now the desire to kill oneself and to assassinate, poison, obliterate or rape others is generally considered in 
the psychiatric profession as ‘unhealthy.’ Bad. Evil. More accurately, sin. When you have the desire to kill 
yourself, you are supposed to ‘accept it,’ but not, for Christ’s sake, to kill yourself. If you desire to have 
carnal knowledge for a helpless teeny-bopper, you are supposed to accept your lust, and not lay a finger on 
even her big toe. If you hate your father, fine – but don’t slug the bastard with a bat. Understand yourself, 
accept yourself, but do not be yourself.188  
The philosophy of the novel is to break free from the constraints of social normality, in essence, to rid 
oneself of the existence experienced by Kafka’s Gregor Samsa.189 The law of the Dice, to which 
Rhineheart indoctrinates himself, is essentially used in order to “give to men a sense of freedom, 
exhilaration, joy.”190 To live by the dice is ultimately to restore happiness to the personality, to fully 
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appreciate all aspects of it, in order to live as a whole human being. In the throw of the dice, one’s 
true desires are given a ‘sporting chance’ and it is this very sense of chance which illustrates the 
oscillation of the metamodern moment. Much like the pendulum described by Vermeulen and Akker, 
living by chance is to oscillate back and forth between the possibility of success and failure. However, 
in the novel it is not necessarily success and failure which are brought to light, instead, it is the 
possibility of allowing one’s true self, or indeed selves to be identified and given a true and 
unrepressed sense of agency. 
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I: Freedom and the Self in The Dice Man. 
Freedom, reader, is an awful thing: so Jean Paul Sartre, Eric Fromm, Albert Camus and dictators throughout the 
world continually tell us.191 
 
Our understanding of the term ‘chance’ today varies entirely from its connotations throughout the 
ages. In a detailed account of the history of chance, Reith explains that chance has developed from an 
entity marked only by its relationship with the divine in classical texts “as a sacred sign of the 
Gods”,192 into a more scientific understanding of the term today. Chance’s development can be 
summed up as a progression from the realm of “Fortuna” to that of “Scientia”193 These contrasting 
notions are on show in Rhineheart’s novel, as the protagonist reverses this trend, starting out as a man 
of psychoanalytical science and becoming a man who entrusts his own life to the powers of fate.   
 
Broadly speaking, chance is still an area of philosophical thinking which troubles the critic. Chance is 
quite simply as we know it to be, random and unpredictable, and can be summed up by Jordan’s 
discussion of the unpredictable movement of atoms. What Jordan suggests is that the creation of form 
is achieved through the unpredictability of falling atoms, “like raindrops”. With the intervention of 
‘the clinamen’, like a ‘bolt of lightning’ which disrupts the fall of raindrops, those atoms are forced 
into a new direction, taking on a new and unpredictable course, which ultimately creates the future 
event.194  
   Describing his passion, the protagonist of the novel compares the study of ‘dice life’ with the 
interruption of chance, which propels the assimilated adult back into their infancy, in an attempt to 
escape their ordered state of self. He explains that he wants “To restore to life the same shock of 
experience we have when bare toes first feel the earth at dawn and we see the sun split through the 
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mountain trees like horizontal lightening.” Thus, form and creation are created out of unpredictability 
and deviation and are, as Jordan explains, “due to the clinamen”195 The clinamen here is as the die in 
Rhineheart’s novel; like the lightening which pierces coherency ‘horizontally’. The fall of the die will 
dictate his every move, resulting in an unpredictable set of events. In the preface to the novel, 
Rhineheart describes his work as “A cunning chaos” and he makes clear that “my style shall be 
random, with the wisdom of the Dice.”196 The fictional Rhineheart submits to the will of the falling 
dice, reflecting his engagement with the falling of unpredictable atoms.  
 
The Dice Man portrays the removal of form and coherency and the embracement of the random and 
the chaotic, the unpredictable and the spasmodic. The protagonist is much like McCarthy’s enactor 
who also moved to embrace the random in order to locate authenticity, “I needed to go irrational on 
the whole thing. Illogical.”197 From a metamodern perspective, this is a novel which resembles the 
paradox of communication perfectly. By embracing the unpredictability and randomness of chance, 
Rhineheart reveals a commitment to the impossible. The protagonist attempts to escape the 
restrictions placed on the self, or internally repressed selves, by going down the road of chance and in 
doing so, works towards achieving a sense of autonomy. It is a novel which is undoubtedly aware, and 
therefore akin to Remainder in style, of the impossibility of presenting freedom of the individual self. 
However, it seemingly embraces this impossibility, and in doing so, reveals itself to be oscillation 
back and forth between failure and the possibility of success. The goal of dismantling totality is aimed 
for, even though it is ultimately a forever unachievable task.  
   In The Dice Man, there is on show something of the autobiographical in the text’s presentation. 
Alongside the fictional Rhineheart taking on the name of his author, or rather the author’s pseudonym, 
he is also a literary representation of the genuine article, to some extent at least. George Cockroft, i.e. 
Luke Rhineheart was indeed a student and subsequent Doctor of Psychology before becoming a 
teacher and then fictional writer. Like his protagonist, he is also a father and husband. The novel itself 
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was in fact inspired by Cockroft’s own experimentation with dice. It seems somewhat appropriate 
then that it was indeed by chance, literally, that ‘Dice Life’ led to the creation of The Dice Man.  
 
Distinct similarities can be made between the novel and the confessional texts of the Romantic period. 
The Dice Man navigates between first, second and third person, and the reader is often addressed by 
the protagonist, or as it were, the author himself. Speaking directly to the reader is a strategy used by 
the Romantic writers such as Mary Wollstonecraft or Jean-Jacques Rousseau, often for political 
purposes. Similarly, what we see in The Dice Man is a philosophical offering. The fictional 
Rhineheart, as has already been suggested, seeks to change the human personality for the better. His 
strange and unidentifiable behaviour is often questioned by his friends and colleagues in the text, as 
living by the die results in the chaotic transformation of his character, and at times causes harm to 
those around him. As has been discussed, rape, adultery, sexual experimentation are not excluded 
from  the will of the dice, and so anything that the social order views as unhealthy behaviour is given 
the chance of experience in Dice Life. What he makes clear in his confessions, is that he seeks to 
disturb the foundations of unhappy humanity: 
And thus my eccentricities, inconsistencies, absurdities, and breakdowns of the last year have all been the 
logical consequences of a highly original but highly rational approach to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness.198 
It is made clear throughout the text that the point of Dice Life is to improve life, to create joy and to 
ascertain a ‘free’ personality. It is through chance, the rolling of dice and the gamble, that Rhineheart 
claims that true freedom of the soul is a possibility.  
 
Freedom ascertained through gambling is an idea that can be identified in the writings of Plato, who 
believed the notion of Play to be a route to an improved existence, as Reith makes clear:  
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For Plato, the faculty of play is the highest attribute of humanity, and we have a duty to live by its precepts; 
to spend our lives ‘making our play as perfect as possible’. This is the key to a happy, peaceful and above 
all, divine existence.199  
Rhineheart clearly draws on Platonic views about chance and the experience of play in order to build 
a world which deviates from social normality, and in doing so, questions the role and existence of 
man. For Rhineheart, the true nature and personality of man has been confined to obey the rules and 
structures of everyday life and Dice Life allows access to the hidden self or selves which are 
repressed; “ ‘Every personality is the sum total of accumulated suppressions of minorities.’”200 Thus, 
by committing to chance, mankind is able to experience the many aspects of the hidden personality 
which are commonly never in use, and as such are able to experience their true desires, resulting in 
the experience and embodiment of true freedom.  
Further to this, as Reith suggests, the idea of play, to embrace that which is no longer pre-determined, 
is to achieve a sense of freedom from the routine, and therefore one is able to experience new 
identities which would otherwise remain hidden: 
Just as the play world is animated by a different set of rules from those which govern everyday life, so 
players within it are animated by a different set of motivations from those of their everyday routines in 
which they are free to experiment with new roles and to temporarily adopt new identities.201  
This is something which Rhineheart puts to use in The Dice Man. By following the commands of the 
dice, he is able to take on new ways of existing, which allow him to experience an apparent sense of 
freedom. He finds he is able to indulge in repressed desires and understand hidden aspects of the self 
which up until Dice Life were unexplored. When Rhineheart openly admits in the novel that he has 
“consciously created schizophrenia”,202 he means that he has liberated the repressed true identity of 
his individuality. He quite literally takes on multiple personalities at the command of chance.  
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Happiness then, is an attribute which the fictional Rhineheart believes is missing from the personality. 
For this protagonist, selfhood as it stands in normality is restricted, bored and not at all a real 
presentation of the true identity of the personality. The choice to experiment with Dice in order to 
experience a heightened existence and completely random and unpredictable personae, is a result of 
the feeling of emptiness caused by his routinized lifestyle; “I hated myself and the world because I 
had failed to face and accept the limitations of my self and of life.”203 What becomes clear is his 
resentment towards the social order, which speaks of the freedom of humanity in a capitalist driven, 
Western world. The true self is repressed while the illusory self remains limited; “The assumption is 
that a limited and bored self is the unavoidable, all-embracing norm.”204  
 
Boredom plays a large part in Rhineheart’s lead up to Dice Life, the start of which he satirically labels 
‘D-Day’, and he draws the comparative line between success and limitation; “My life before D-Day 
was routine, humdrum, repetitious, trivial, compulsive, disordered, irritable – the life of a typically 
successful married man.”205 With this in mind, Dice Life can be viewed as an experiment of self-
understanding, a way of attempting to fulfil hidden desires. As a psychiatrist, Rhineheart deviates 
from everything he ‘knows’ about the human mind, and embraces the world of chance in order to 
escape routine and boredom. His turning his back on psychiatry is presented in the symbolic turning 
of his portrait of Freud towards the wall. Rather than committing to the understanding of one self, as 
with the Freudian concept of psychology, he desires to draw out the multiplicity of the self, not just 
from in himself, but in the selves of others.  
 
The investigation of human personality in The Dice Man, as we have observed, is played out through 
a central commitment to chance and chance, as gambling, allows for the alteration of identity. Chance 
in the novel portrays the escape from a ‘normality’ which the protagonist views as detrimental to the 
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true freedom of the self. Freedom for Rhineheart then appears to be the distinction drawn by Anthony 
Kenny between ‘the concept of liberty of spontaneity and the concept of liberty of indifference’.206 
Kenny argues that the concept of liberty of spontaneity “approaches free will through the notion of 
desire or wanting” and goes on to suggest that the concept of liberty of indifference “approaches free 
will through the notion of ability of power.”207 What stands for Rhineheart in the novel as the 
restriction of one’s true desires, one’s true ‘wants’ is liberty of spontaneity. The use of chance, the 
giving over of one’s self to the concept of anything goes allows for the transmutation into the liberty 
of indifference; “men must attempt to eliminate the error and develop in themselves and their children 
liberation from the sense of self.”208  
This sense of self stands for the unreal of the character or personality, and Dice Life leads to an 
engagement with the multiple self. Kenny makes clear that liberty of indifference “sees free will as 
essentially a capacity for alternative action; to act freely is to act in possession of the power to act 
otherwise.”209 To live by the ‘rules’ of chance, the rules of the gambler, is to embrace indifference, to 
ascertain the power of expression, to be able to ‘act otherwise’. Rhineheart, defending his 
commitment to the embracement of chance suggests: 
I imagine a world in which each individual might be about to play the lover, the benefactor, the sponger, the 
attacker, the friend: and once known as one of those, the next day he might yet be anything.210 
In the world of The Dice Man, definition acts as a prison for the self, as the self is not identifiable in 
truth. Dice Life and the use of chance removes meaning from that which is identifiable in the norm of 
society, making problematic any sense of definition of any individual. Rather than attempting to 
create personality, Dice Life is an attempt to make personality indefinable, which in fact it is. The 
reality of the human self is not as categorization would define it. It is fluid and chaotic, random and 
unpredictable. This is the message of The Dice Man.  
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Rhineheart the protagonist is accused in the novel of acting differently once he commits to Dice Life, 
of taking on alternative personalities which are masking who he really is. However, what the author is 
proposing is the notion that chance allows for the actuality of identity to be experienced. The multiple 
personalities which Rhineheart embodies in the text are in this sense the true selves which are 
repressed socially. Deleuze suggests that “it is the masked, the disguise or the costumed which turns 
out to be the truth of the uncovered.”211 What appear as false aspects of the self once the die are 
thrown are in reality the true personalities of Rhineart’s character, and the protagonist is acting out the 
true nature of the self through his engagement with chance. While the novel is concerned with the 
postmodern predicament of the incarceration of the self through imposed artificiality such as 
capitalism, or hyperreality for example, it attempts to embrace difference and the other in order to 
generate the emancipation of the self from its paradoxical relationship with authenticity.   
 
It has thus far been discussed that Rhineheart’s novel attempts to fathom the random nature of the 
human self, or the human mind. This is not to suggest however that it is Rhineheart’s prerogative to 
remove logic from experience by way of chance. On the contrary, there is abounding in the text an 
exploration of logic. The novel’s protagonist deliberately, and more importantly logically, rolls the 
dice in order to understand more about his self. The logic of dice rolling displayed in the text is to 
deviate, as has been suggested from the social norm, in order to quite literally become truthful. When 
he is questioned by a disciplinary panel concerning his recently strange and harmful behaviour, 
Rhineheart suggests, “Our society of today is based on conflicting lies.”212 Dice therapy stands for 
revealing the truth of the personality that it is, “by definition, unpredictable.”213 Therefore, there is a 
degree of planned randomness, or planned chaos in the throwing of dice. The outcome is random and 
specifically unpredictable, but the physical act of self-discovery through chance is done so 
methodically. With this in mind, what is on show in The Dice Man is a certain regard for what Julia 
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Jordan would refer to as ‘muddle’. Jordan, speaking in regards to the fiction of Iris Murdoch, suggests 
that “the notion of muddle and an ability to bear it…define a person.”214 She goes on to say that “An 
affinity with mess, with aspects of the natural world and its paradigm of formlessness, or with the 
accidental, are all consistently shown to be a path to the illusive good.”215 With this in mind, an 
“affinity with mess” can be seen in Luke Rhineheart’s novel. The protagonist embraces the 
randomness of the self in order to establish a free and truthful sense of being, as Rhineheart explains, 
“Dice therapy alone acknowledges what we all know and choose to forget: man is multiple.’”216  
 
Concerning the movement of metamodernism, The Dice Man’s use of chance works towards 
achieving this ‘illusive good’ to which Jordan refers. It portrays the progressive attempt to 
comprehend the self as imagined as something more real, outside the world of the illusory depiction 
of selfhood as outlined by trivial and banal commonality. To a large extent then, The Dice Man is a 
celebration of the chaos of selfhood, or multiple personality. For Rhineheart, the only way man can be 
free to act is through chance. By rolling the dice, he can access the chaotic nature of his self, and 
therefore experience reality in all its glory: 
“If a person can attain a strong confidence in his inconsistency and unreliability, a strong yea-saying sense of 
the impermanency of things and of an unintegrated, nonpatterned chaos of selves, he will be fully at home in 
a multivalent society – he will be joyous.”217  
Rhineheart, echoing the vocabulary of Nietzsche here seeks the multiplicity of the self, which is 
emancipated from the rules and structures which govern the self ideologically. This celebration of the 
chaotic is something described as positive by B. S Johnson. Johnson, according to Jordan, “situated 
himself among the avant garde tradition” and sought to discover the unpresentable reality in fiction. In 
regards to chaos, Johnson suggests, “[life is] really all chaos…let’s celebrate the chaos. Let’s 
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celebrate the accidental.”218 As suggested earlier, The Dice Man can be viewed as a postmodern text, 
and there is an obvious parallel which can be drawn between Johnson’s thoughts here and those of 
Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition. In terms of the aesthetic values of Rhineheart’s novel 
however, there is a clear indication of his attempts to promote the random and chaotic nature of the 
personality, which of course is problematic due to the inconsistency which Rhineheart himself admits 
of the self. Therefore there seems to be at work in the novel an attempt to present the impossible. 
Rhineheart is aware of a certain impossibility of presenting chance through fiction, just as much as 
comprehending the infinitely chaotic personality of the human mind. As Jordan suggests, chance can 
only remain secondary to the demands of narrative story-telling and therefore, “pure chance can rarely 
be fully present in narrative.”219 Jordan goes on to say that “To embrace chance is to commit to those 
very subversive capabilities that eventually lead to the failure of its representation.”220 Rhineheart’s 
committal to the infinite nature of pure representation resembles the oscillating paradox of 
metamodernism.  
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II: The Limited Nature of Chance. 
In The Dice Man, chance is portrayed in the form of the gamble. Dr Rhineheart places on the numbers 
of the die the opportunity for repressed desires to come in to play in his life. The initial use of this 
action of supposed freedom is brought about when he decides to take a chance on rape: 
If that die has a one face up, I thought, I’m going downstairs and rape Arlene. ‘If it’s a one, I’ll rape Arlene,’ 
kept blinking on and off in my mind like a huge neon light and my terror increased. But when I thought if 
it’s not a one I’ll go to bed, the terror was boiled away by a pleasant excitement and my mouth swelled into a 
gargantuan grin: a one means rape, the other numbers mean bed, the die is cast. Who am I to question the 
die?221 
What follows is the eventual rape of Arlene once the die reveals a ‘one’. The course of the novel is 
dictated by the continued use of this technique, as Rhineheart relies on fate to allow the hidden desires 
of repressed selves to be experienced randomly. For Rhineheart the protagonist, the decision to act out 
the demands of the die are in fact the acting out of true desires which without the constraints placed 
on them by societies’ ‘normalisation’, would be given free rein.  
 
For Rhineheart the author, the use of chance in narrative is a vessel through which the depiction of the 
random and chaotic personality can be presented to the reader. However, the failure of narrative to be 
able to present pure chance and Rhineheart’s awareness of this failure allows the text to be viewed as 
metamodern, as The Dice Man reflects the paradox of presenting chance through fiction. By 
embracing the inevitable failure or portraying the workings of chance, Rhineheart commits to the 
impossible act of true representation, much like McCarthy does in Remainder. Further to this, if 
chance is as Jordan suggests incomprehensible in nature, then it takes on the form of the infinite and 
in The Dice Man there seems to be a strong connection between chance and the notion of infinity. By 
allowing for the occurrence of numerous possibilities through the throw of the dice, the protagonist 
delves into the world of infinity.  
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Rhinheart’s reliance on the dice to decide the outcome of a number of possible futures, such as the 
possible rape of Arlene, spells out a strange yet interesting connection to Jorge Luis Borges’ The 
Garden of Forking Paths. In The Dice Man, Rhineheart builds a set of outcomes for himself, 
eliminating all but one via the physical action of the gamble. However, in The Garden of Forking 
Paths, we are provided with the notion of potentiality, in which all paths both occur and don’t occur: 
In all fictional works, each time a man is confronted with several alternatives, he chooses one and eliminates 
others; in the fiction of Ts’ui Pên, he chooses – simultaneously – all of them. He creates, in this way, diverse 
futures, diverse times which themselves also proliferate and fork.222 
Rhineheart eliminates the possible outcomes which would prohibit him from raping Arlene, and yet 
the author displays an essential awareness of the philosophy of Borges. The eventual rape is not 
carried out as rape at all. The word rape is used to describe the event which occurs between the two 
characters, however what actually occurs is the mutual act of intercourse which the characters have 
presumably always desired but never acted upon. In this sense, rape both happens and at the same 
time does not. Chance here creates an infinity of action, where possible futures are played out 
simultaneously. Central to The Dice Man however is the impossibility of becoming completely free. 
Rhineheart plays with the notion of potentiality, as with Borges, and yet concludes that the infinite 
nature of selfhood, of self-expression and understanding can never be comprehended, or indeed 
expressed even through fiction. In this sense, the depiction of a failed articulation of all possible 
outcomes occurring marks out the metamodern aesthetic of the novel.   
 
The most important observation to be made about the novel is its concern for removing structure, 
order and categorization from reality, in order to bring about the random and chaotic of the 
personality. Concerning the relationship between infinity and chance, Paulo Zellini explains that the 
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difference between that which is limited, or the limit, and that which is infinite, is the difference 
between structure, or logic, and the breakdown of form: 
Limit is what makes every object exist concretely, by constantly endowing it with its proper form and 
individuality. It is also what determines the logical order of events, by removing them as far as possible from 
pure chance.223  
Zellini suggests here that form and order are the products of the limited space. He also brings to light 
the notion that chance can be compared with the unlimited, or “apeiron”. Chance is an entity which 
suggests ‘anything can happen’, and therefore it relates to that which cannot be categorized; it remains 
disconnected from the limit, taking on the role of the incomprehensible or unlimited space. This is an 
idea which Rhineheart is undoubtedly making full use of in the novel, by showing the need for an 
expression of multiplicity. 
   Multiplicity is the embodiment in the novel of true experience, the portrayal and acting out of the 
unlimited capacity of the human soul, as the protagonist suggests, “our deepest desire is to be 
multiple: to play many roles.”224 Dr Rhineheart desires to deviate from what he considers to be a 
failing normality by embracing chaos and unpredictability and breaking down any sense of an ordered 
routine. Where limit provides order, Zellini also explains that “…the principle of apeiron…manifests 
itself both in the dissolution of forms and as an element of chance.”225 Chance then, can be used to 
convey the potential for the unlimited experience, as form is dissolved, and an all-embracing act of 
unpredictability is brought to the surface. The moral message of The Dice Man is that to embrace 
chance is to live in a world outside social normality.  
 
Society is depicted in the text as a development which has failed the nature of the individual, by 
placing it in a metaphorical cage, a “prison”, which has led to the travesties and devastation that we 
know and have come to expect of the current predicament of the world. Dr Rhineheart speaks of the 
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contrast between what is deemed as normal and that which could be seen as a world lived in 
accordance with chance; “The social consequences of a nation of dicepeople are, by definition, 
unpredictable. The social consequences of a nation of normal personalities are obvious: misery, 
conflict, violence, war and a universal joylessness.”226 ‘Dice therapy’ is for the protagonist a possible 
answer to injustice, as it allows for the freedom of the personality, even if that means allowing the 
rapist, the murderer to roam free. This striking message has obvious negatives, which did lead to the 
banning of the text in several countries when it was first published.227 It can be assumed that the 
author does not desire to commit rape or murder; he merely commits to chance, to the random in order 
to present freedom and recognizes that it can never actually be achieved in reality.  
 
The author’s awareness of this paradox reveals the novel’s presentation of a metamodernist discourse. 
The notion that the human personality is infinitely random and chaotic suggests that it cannot be 
presented, as Zellini explains, “According to Aristotle…something which has no limit (peras) cannot 
be exhaustively represented in our thought, and is therefore unknowable.”228 Not only does a lack of 
comprehension about the human self imply that society’s depiction of normality is an illusion, it is 
also indicative of the novel that the true self is ‘unknowable’.  In this recognition, he writes about the 
impossible goal of achieving true freedom, and as such, embraces the paradox of metamodernism. 
 
The fact that The Dice Man is a text which identifies the illusions of reality and reports upon social 
categorisation for the purpose of normalisation is enough to consider it to be a postmodern text. 
However, its commitment to the impossible and its awareness of its own inadequacies propel it into 
the position of the metamodern. It is a novel which imagines a world of freedom of the individual, a 
notion which at this time appears to be like the ‘horizon which is forever receding’.229 Rhineheart 
presents freedom through the notion of the gamble, which, as Reith makes clear, allows the individual 
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to feel a temporary connection to freedom, even though it is an imagined connection. In the “outside 
world”, Reith suggests, freedom is something which doesn’t exist, and yet through gambling, the 
gambler can experience “free rein”.230  
 
The paradox of locating freedom and ultimately failing is one that goes back to the thoughts of Sartre, 
as Mary Warnock suggests: 
Not only does he say that freedom is a case of all for nothing; one must be totally free or not at all; but he 
also seems to claim that it is intuitively obvious that man is free; indeed that the concept of human action 
entails the concept of freedom. And yet he regards men as bound, by an apparently ineluctable necessity, to 
aim at certain (gloomy impossible) ends.231  
Sartre’s view here is seemingly contradictory. First he reports on the ‘one or the other’ nature of 
freedom, suggesting that it is either there or it isn’t, indicating that one person might have it, and 
another may not. He then envisages the paradox of a ““both-neither” dynamic” located in 
metamodernism.232 Here the subject could be regarded as both free and yet at the same time not free at 
all. It is the latter concept that is on show in The Dice Man. The author regards freedom certainly in 
this existential manner, as something that is in humanity, something which humanity should be able to 
embrace once and for all. However, it also recognises the limitations of achieving true freedom. It 
portrays the struggle to gain freedom in spite of an inevitable failure to do so. For Jordan, freedom is 
bound up in the spontaneous nature of chance, just as, Zellini suggests, chance is bound up in the 
breaking down of order and logic, and Jordan makes clear that true spontaneity, true freedom is 
something to which we must aspire.233 The Dice Man then, may seem to be a postmodern text, and yet 
it reveals the movement to achieve finality knowing full well that this is impossible, and in doing so, 
embraces the metamodern oscillation of moving forwards and forever turning back.  
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Conclusion. 
 
What’s going on just now? What’s happening to us? What is this world, this period, this precise moment in 
which we are living? 
                                                                                                               Michel Foucault.234   
 
Michel Foucault’s question is one which has been asked repeatedly throughout history and is one 
which can be applied to any given ‘period’, if indeed there is such a thing. It is a question which 
forever troubles those that ask it and confuses those who make any such attempt at answering it. It is a 
question which can be compared to ‘what is the meaning of life?’ or ‘why are we here?’ With this in 
mind there is a resounding consensus of discomfort surrounding such a question, marked purely by 
the notion that it is quite simply, unanswerable. Strictly speaking, we do set out to put forward 
numerous answers to Foucault’s troublesome question through art, literature and theory. However, 
any degree of truth embedded in those answers is explicated in the moment they are uttered. This is 
due to the ever-changing and ever-shifting nature of the world in which we live. Because of this, truth 
becomes a constant mutation, unable to be captured or pinned down. This too becomes problematic 
however, due to the fact that as we progress temporally, our evolutionary understanding of what once 
was, locates the past in a position that is constantly open to reinterpretation. Nothing, in a sense, holds 
firm, and what becomes something ‘defined’ is always reassessed and observed in a new light and 
from different perspectives.  
 
What this means for Foucault’s question is that one cannot simply define ‘this period’. Nor can a label 
be placed on “What’s going on just now?”235 This lack of resolution concerning such a philosophical, 
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political or moral investigation calls forth a new question; why define this moment at all? Fredric 
Jameson would answer, “one cannot not periodize.”236 Is it human nature then to categorize, label and 
ascertain definition of our current situation, be that in past times or in the present? Is the need for one 
specific truth of totality already built in? This may well be the case. It arguably was for modernist 
thinkers. For the postmodernists however, categorization was a pointless act, as ascribing to human 
nature any sense of definition would suggest that it is based upon a foundational past which could be 
captured and pinned down, as Gane and Gane suggest: 
postmodernism is about the pleasure of death (the death of the author, of universality, of meta-narratives, 
of absolute truth, of progress, and so on). It is about working into the unknown in the absence of all 
foundations.237   
As such what we once defined as the postmodern is assumed to be a ‘period’ of disassociation from 
form and coherency. 
 
It has been the concern of this dissertation to investigate the contemporary situation that we have now 
arrived at with the end of the postmodern ‘period’. As stated in the introduction, suggesting that the 
postmodern is over proves to be problematic, as many if indeed not all of its formal features carry on 
in to the ‘new’ realm of theory. While there are many positions put forward through which to locate 
the contemporary situation ‘post’-postmodernism, I have chosen to discuss the movement of 
metamodernism due to its primary concern for the uncertainties of our globalised world.  
   Concerning the movement from the postmodern through to the metamodern, where postmodern 
tendencies are thought to be continuing on into this arguably new epoch of theory and culture, it is 
clear to see that there are unquestionable similarities between the postmodern ‘period’ and that of an 
emerging period of metamodernism. Slavoj Žižek for example speaks of postmodern texts, usually 
associated with trauma, as being an endorsement of the infinite in presentation, which offer multiple 
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possibilities for articulating the impossible Real, while always maintaining that reality or truth is 
forever unpresentable.238 On the surface it seems that there is no deviation between the postmodern in 
this sense and metamodernism, which also highlights the notion of the impossible Real. However, as I 
have argued, the focal difference between the two terms is a question of emphasis, as metamodernism 
appears to navigate away from the nihilistic form traditionally associated with the postmodern, 
gravitating instead towards the impossible Real. Metamodernism continues to pursue an infinite 
number of possible truths but with hope and engagement, all the while knowing that it will always be 
oscillating upon the postmodern paradox.   
 
I have applied the theory of metamodernism to Tom McCarthy’s Remainder and Luke Rhineheart’s 
The Dice Man. While Remainder is a recent novel, and as such can easily be interpreted as belonging 
to a ‘period’ which has followed on from the postmodern, The Dice Man, it can be argued due to its 
date of publication, is likely to be viewed as nothing more than a novel belonging solely to the 
postmodern ‘period’. This however, also proves to be problematic. It seems to be the case that while 
metamodernism can certainly be applied to the current predicament, it can also be applied to previous 
times and events. Vermeulen and Akker are of the opinion that although 9/11 did not necessarily lead 
to the development of metamodernism, it did occur after the event. However, there is no doubt that 
the theory of metamodernism can be found prior to 9/11, just as the features of postmodernism can be 
located in contemporary fiction.  
 
I have argued this by discussing both postmodernism and metamodernism in relation to two novels 
which were written prior to the 9/11 attacks. This goes to suggest that periodization is not necessarily 
chronological. Instead, it appears to be the case that there is a breakdown between theoretical 
boundaries, and that the postmodern cannot be confined to any particular time zone. Thus, the same 
can indeed be suggested of metamodernism. The desire for alterity, happiness, wholeness, authenticity 
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that is on show in a novel such as Rhineheart’s is there to be observed in a recent novel like 
Remainder, making it quite clear that such human characteristics have always been with us. They 
feature in the works of Joyce, Woolf, Kafka, Eliot, Vonnegut, Barnes, and so on. However, there is 
clearly a manoeuvring of emphasis throughout modernism, postmodernism and now metamodernism, 
if it is to be taken as the ‘new’ epoch. Metamodernism highlights postmodernist assumptions about 
identity, history, ideology etc. but also challenges them, as it strives to move beyond the postmodern 
world. Although postmodern assumptions about the world and the subject cannot be abandoned 
completely, they can be confronted.  
 
In this essay, I have outlined the characteristics of postmodernism, discussing the thoughts of Fredric 
Jameson, Jean-François Lyotard, Linda Hutcheon and Jean Baudrillard. These postmodern theorists 
engage with the postmodern condition with alternative perspectives and so are all vital to any 
discussion surrounding what comes after it. It was suggested that while Jameson envisages the 
postmodern as a distinct period which follows after modernism, Lyotard dispels any suggestion that 
the postmodern was a period at all. With this in mind, if the postmodern was as Lyotard suggests 
merely a rupture within modernity, as he makes clear in his Postmodern Condition, then perhaps the 
metamodern could be best described as a sealing up of that rupture. If this is indeed the case, then 
metamodernism, along with postmodernism is simply another tendency of the modern period. This 
could suggest that metamodernism does not follow on from postmodernism, and that we are not in a 
state of post-postmodernity. Instead, what we have possibly arrived at, or to be more precise returned 
to, is the on-going project of the modern period.    
 
I have chosen to apply the theory of metamodernism, alongside the theories of trauma, the sublime 
and chance to two novels which I have concluded can be envisaged as belonging to the ‘period’ of 
metamodernism. By discussing Remainder and its relationship with trauma theory and that of the 
sublime, McCarthy’s novel can be viewed as a piece of contemporary fiction which oscillates back 
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and forth between the philosophy of the postmodern and the doctrine of the modern, and as such 
enters into the metamodern position of the post-postmodern paradox. It searches out authenticity just 
as much as its own protagonist in its exploration of articulating reality, all the while maintaining an 
awareness that it can never be more than what it is, i.e. a piece of fiction, or words on a page. Linda 
Hutcheon’s discussion of historiographic metafiction makes it clear that history can never truly be 
recalled through the text, however, and ironically, the only way we interpret history is through the 
text.239 Remainder embraces this paradox, and strives to overcome it. Ultimately however, as the 
novel is itself aware, it is always destined to fail, and it is therefore in keeping with the movement of 
metamodernism, which persists in spite of an inevitable failure. 
 
In The Dice Man, it has been argued, there is an attempt to ‘rid’ the subject of order and logic so as to 
promote all aspects of the hidden self into reality, thus enabling the protagonist to embody a complete 
and realistic existence. Rhineheart articulates this attempt through the novel’s relationship with 
chance. Chance, as has been argued, functions in the novel as a method by which the internalisation of 
the self can be enhanced and therefore brought out to a position of freedom. There does seem to be a 
difference between the two novels. McCarthy shows an absolute awareness for the impossibility of 
achieving a lasting connection to a reality which is not constructed. On the other hand, there is 
certainly evidence to suggest that Rhineheart strongly believes in completely breaking down the 
boundary between reality and inauthenticity. In this sense, The Dice Man reveals itself to be more 
postmodern than Remainder. What is beyond a doubt is that both novels articulate a need for 
improvement in their cultural times and as such reflect upon the human condition which is to escape 
the confined space of constructed reality. They portray an incessant desire for improvement, are 
located upon a metamodern oscillation between success and failure, and depict the paradox of 
overcoming inauthenticity.  
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The fact that presenting reality, or seeking authenticity is perhaps best described as impossible, does 
not suggest that contemporary authors should consign themselves to the postmodern position of 
ending in silence. Novels such as Remainder and The Dice Man articulate an aversion from collapse 
and are therefore what Kellner refers to as “Utopian maps”.240 Kellner suggests that: 
Utopian maps depart from the distinction between what is and what can be, between actuality and 
potentiality, as they envision the realization of possibilities for human freedom, charting the “not yet.”241 
My chosen novels propel themselves forward, imagining a world that is in the distance, where 
freedom should be grasped at. However, they also articulate the realisation that this freedom is at this 
moment out of reach. Kellner notes the importance of striving to continue theorizing about the human 
condition in order to overcome our current predicament. He suggests that “Without theory, 
interpretation, and critique we are as lost and hapless as Columbus on his first voyage.”242 Toth 
reinforces this suggestion, making clear that the illusions of reality and the loss of originality and 
history have led to a resounding outcry, a reason to “keep writing”.243 In the novels discussed here, 
this drive to become more than what we are, especially in Remainder, is repeated. Although there is 
the ever present notion that comprehension, as the postmodernists made clear, is impossible, we must 
continue to pursue, as the metamodernists are now doing, the ‘forever receding horizon’.244  This need 
for comprehension, Kellner asserts, is especially important in the uncertain situation that we now find 
ourselves: 
Since our social and cultural situation is difficult to grasp, especially in a hypercapitalist culture of 
spectacles, simulacra, and disinformation, we need to comprehend how our lives are being shaped and 
controlled.245 
 In the current climate of uncertainty, anxiety and tension, there is in the same instance a resolute and 
unifying stance as we attempt to grasp that unreachable distance. What is on show in Remainder and 
The Dice Man is a desire to comprehend the impossible, and at the same time a desire to overcome it. 
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